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ABSTRACT: This Article identifies and analyzes the structural forces that
permit and ignore racialized sexual harassment in housing. Although
scholarship on sexual harassment in housing is sparse, the existing research and
resulting body of law generally advances a narrative focused on the female
tenants' economic vulnerability and violation of the sanctity of her home. The
narrative advanced in scholarship and advocacy, along with the resulting
jurisprudence, presents an archetype of a deviant male landlord abusing his
authority to take advantage of women sexually who, because of their economic
circumstances, have no alternatives. This Article terms it the "dirty old man"
narrative. Drawing attention to the racialized sexual harassment that lies
beneath the stock story for many African American female tenants, this Article
dismantles that narrative. The purpose of the scholarship is two-fold. The first
is to expose, for the first time, the undercurrent of racialized sexual
victimization that is absent from the "dirty old man" narrative. To do that, this
project methodically examines court filings in sexual harassment cases brought
by the Attorney General under the federal Fair Housing Act and analyzes the
entire body of federal and state court opinions assessing residential sexual
harassment claims. The second objective is to identify the structural factors-
cultural acceptance of the "Black Jezebel" myth, legal rights, access, and
generational economic and racial hierarchies-that operate together to
perpetuate racialized sexual harassment in rental housing, an analysis that
draws on social science research, along with critical race, critical feminist, and
intersectionality theories. This Article contends that those structural forces are
the same factors that have operated to permit and hide the sexual subjugation of
Black women in the private sphere throughout history-during slavery, as
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domestic workers, and in the present-day failure to prosecute sexual assault
against Black women. Ultimately, it argues that the prevailing "dirty old man"
narrative risks silencing both the individual stories of racialized sexual
harassment at home and the larger conversation about the structural forces
permitting and ignoring the abuse.
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INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment in rental housing is a pervasive problem in the United
States, especially for the most vulnerable women in our society. For Black
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women experiencing a distinct form of racialized sexual harassment' in their
homes, the abuse is part of an historical and structural acceptance of the sexual
subjugation of Black women in the domestic sphere. Unfortunately, the legal
structure of the anti-discrimination laws used to redress residential sexual
harassment 2  provides insignificant opportunity to address complex
intersectionality or fight the structural forces that perpetuate the abuse of
3
women, particularly Black women.
In response to the law's limitations, scholars and advocates have developed
a standard narrative to describe residential sexual harassment. The stock story,
which I call the "dirty old man" narrative,4 depicts an aberrant bad actor male
landlord abusing his authority to take advantage sexually of women who,
because of economic circumstances, have no alternatives. Both the perpetrator
and the victim in the "dirty old man" narrative are one-dimensional. As a "dirty
old man," the perpetrator in a residential sexual harassment case is generally
described as a man acting outside of the standards of society and the law.
Because the term "dirty old man" is often employed as a means of encouraging,
explaining or excusing behavior that is outside of cultural norms,5 the use of the
1. 1 define "racialized sexual harassment" as a particular subset of sexual harassment where racial
animus is a component of the harassment itself Although women of color may experience sexual
harassment differently than White women, or may be disproportionately vulnerable to sexual
harassment, the focus of this Article is on a particular kind of sexual harassment where racial animus is
embedded in the sexual harassment.
2. There are various legal avenues for seeking redress for sexual harassment in rental housing. See
infra Section ll.A. This Article focuses on civil rights challenges under federal and state fair housing
and civil rights laws, where claims are bounded by categories of protected classes (i.e. race, color, sex,
religion, disability, familial status). An in-depth discussion of the possibilities for tort or contract
actions, for example, is beyond the scope of this paper.
3. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICti. L. REV. 2479
(1994) (analyzing judicial reaction to the complex subject under Title VII law); Bradley Allan Areheart,
Intersectionality and Identity: Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII, 17 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 199, 234-
35 (2006); Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1439, 1440 (2009); Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and Title VII A Brief (Pre-)history, 95
B.U. L. REV. 713, 714 n.6 (2015) (citing Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical
Test ofIntersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 991, 992 (2011)) (cataloguing
scholars who have found that "'complex discrimination' claimants fare even worse than other
employment discrimination plaintiffs, facing both structural and ideological barriers to recognition and
redress"); cf Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: "Intersectionality, " "Multidimensionality, "
and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 301-02
(2001) (recognizing, in the constitutional law context, that "courts have failed to recognize that the
cumulative effect of multiple forms of discrimination may create a unique type of victimization that
differs in kind from the sum of individual acts of discrimination").
4. 1 invoke the expression "dirty old man" in this context based on specific allegations in United
States v. Wygul. Complaint at 11(e), United States v. Wygul, No. 2:14-cv-02880 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 10,
2014) (alleging that defendant told complainant "[i]f you ever have the urge to do a dirty old man,
please let me know").
5. See, e.g., Lewis Katz, Tribute to Professor Leon Gabinet, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 14, 15
(2014) (fondly referring to Gabinet as "a great teacher, scholar, song-and-dance man, and the law
school's dirty old man"); Ceci Connolly, Clinton Joins Party in a Spirited Retreat, WASH. POST, Feb.
11, 1998, at A17 (quoting Representative John Dingell referring to Kenneth Starr as a "dirty old man"
in reference to the investigation of President William Clinton); #dirtyoldman, TWITTER (Sept. 22, 2015),
https://twitter.com/search?q-%23dirtyoldman (including hundreds of hits, referencing everyone from
the author of the tweet to Rob Lowe to Joe Biden to Donald Trump). The cultural tropes or standard
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terminology to name the standard narrative explaining residential sexual
harassment risks trivializing the crime of sexual harassment. I purposefully use
the expression with that understanding. This Article argues that the prevailing
narrative (the "dirty old man" narrative) focuses on the aberrant bad actor and
excludes both racialized sexual harassment and the structural forces that
perpetuate it. I chose the expression not because I adopt it as a construct, but
because it represents why the narrative is problematic. 6 Like the perpetrator in
the standard narrative, the victim of sexual harassment in the "dirty old man"
narrative is similarly one-dimensional-an economically vulnerable woman
subject to violation of the sanctity of her home.7
This Article challenges the assumptions underlying the "dirty old man"
narrative by (1) detailing evidence of the existence of racialized sexual
harassment in the home; (2) exposing the nearly wholesale exclusion of that
evidence from scholarship, advocacy, and judicial narratives; and (3)
identifying the structural forces underlying racialized sexual harassment in
housing.8 Ultimately, this Article argues that the prevailing "dirty old man"
narrative is problematic both because it silences particular victims of residential
sexual harassment and because it ignores the structural forces of power that
have operated throughout American history to perpetuate the sexual
subjugation of Black women in the home. More specifically, it identifies four
structural forces that have acted together to empower (primarily White) men
and disempower Black women that are obscured by the "dirty old man"
narrative: cultural acceptance of the Black "Jezebel" myth; legal rights
supporting the power imbalance and ignoring its implication; unfettered access
to Black females and their families; and generational economic and racial
hierarchies.
stories of "dirty old men" are not, however, always so innocent. See, e.g., Andrea L. Fischer, Florida's
Community Notification of Sex Offenders on the Internet: The Disregard of Constitutional Protections
for Sex Offenders, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 505, 510 (1997) (recognizing that the stereotype of a child
molester is that of a "dirty old man").
6. For that reason, I put the expression in quotation marks throughout the piece.
7. See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Knowing Your Place: Theorizing Sexual Harassment at Home, 40
ARIZ. L. REV. 17, 38 (1998) (arguing that the jurisprudence of the Fair Housing Act, adapted from Title
VII jurisprudence, has been unable to fully appreciate or assess the injury associated with sexual
harassment in a woman's home and noting that the experience of poverty is a key factor in being
vulnerable to sexual harassment in housing). For a more complete review of the scholarly literature, see
discussion infra Part Il1.
8. This Article focuses specifically on Black women's experiences of racialized sexual harassment
in housing. Although other women of color experience kinds of sexual harassment or are impacted by
sexual harassment in ways that are excluded from the standard narrative, I focus this piece on Black
women because of the particularly powerful role race has played for Black women in American history.
Other scholars have done similar analyses on the omission of voice in particular legal narratives. For
example, Llezlie Green Coleman explores the omission of Latina voices from the narrative of worker
exploitation in Exploited at the Intersection: A Critical Race Feminist Analysis of Undocumented Latina
Workers and the Role of the Private Attorney General, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 397 (2015). It would
be an interesting and important project to expose and assess the ways that non-Black women of color
experience sexual harassment in housing.
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In United States v. Hurt, for example, the government brought suit against
the property manager and owner of mobile home parks in West Memphis,
Arkansas. 9 The complaint, asserting discrimination based on sex in violation of
the federal Fair Housing Act,'0 alleged that Mr. Hurt "subjected female tenants
and prospective tenants to discrimination on the basis of sex, including severe,
pervasive, and unwelcome sexual harassment."" In Hurt, the government's
case theory' 2 focused on the intersection of poverty and sexual harassment and
invoked the "dirty old man" narrative. Cross-examination of Mr. Hurt
established his knowledge of the tenants' poverty and susceptibility to
homelessness' 3 and the closing argument drew explicitly on themes of poverty,
vulnerability, and the defendant's abuse of his position of power. The attorney
for the United States explained:
What was Bob Hurt's pattern, ladies and gentlemen? It was very
consistent. First, he had a pattern of abusing his power to choose
vulnerable women. He picked his victims carefully. Who did he pick?
He picked women who were struggling with money. He picked women
who were living alone .... He picked women who he knew were not
likely to complain and he picked women who people were not likely to
14believe....
Although the women in Hurt were vulnerable because of their limited
finances, a searching look behind the "dirty old man" narrative reveals
testimonial evidence of racialized sexual harassment. In fact, one woman
testified that, when Mr. Hurt touched her and asked for sex in exchange for the
rental of one of his trailers, he told her that she "had nice titties" and that he
9. Complaint and Request for Jury Trial, United States v. Hurt, No. 3:09-cv-00031-BSM (E.D. Ark.
Mar. 13, 2009). From February 2008 to June 2014, 1 was a trial attorney at the United States Department
of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Housing and Civil Enforcement Section, the Section that brought suit
against Mr. and Mrs. Hurt. I was not a named attorney on the case.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006).
]I. Complaint and Request for Jury Trial, supra note 9, at 1112.
12. Case theory is a concept that is regularly taught in clinical teaching. See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN
ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 122 (2007) ("Arriving at a
theory of the case is the principal educational task of most clinical courses."). Binny Miller defines case
theory as "a snapshot, a framework, the essence of the story or what the case is about." She continues,
"It is not the whole story that a video camera filming the event would tell, but rather the coherent
meaning that the elements create." Binny Miller, Teaching Case Theory, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 293, 298
(2002). Drawing from Miller's approach to teaching case theory, in this Article, I use "case theory'"
synonymously with narrative and story. See id. at 297-98 (describing her case theory teaching method as
"storyline" and noting that "[n]arrative is perhaps the best word for case theory").
13. Transcript of Jury Trial, Vol. 2 at 311, Hurt, No. 3:09-cv-00031-BSM (E.D. Ark. Nov. 17,
2010) ("Q. And you didn't charge a deposit because you knew that many of the tenants wouldn't be able
it pay it off if you did? A. That's correct. Q. Because you knew many of the tenants were poor? A.
That's correct. Q. You knew many of the tenants were living right on the edge of being homeless, didn't
you? A. That is correct. Q. You also knew that they were living in a dangerous neighborhood? A. That is
correct.").
14. Transcript of Jury Trial, Vol. 4 at 553-54, Hurt, No. 3:09-cv-00031-BSM (E.D. Ark. Nov. 19,
2010).
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heard that "black girls had good pussy.' 5 Another manager of mobile homes in
the area testified that the defendant told him that if tenants don't pay, he could
"take one of those black girls to the back and they can show you a thing or two
for the rent."
'1 6
As evidenced by the testimonial evidence in Hurt, the vulnerability
attendant to poverty is not the only lens through which to view sexual
harassment in housing. For a subset of the victims of residential sexual
harassment, race and racism surface in their allegations. This Article uncovers
those stories and explores the impact of their omission from the stock story.
Part I introduces the reader to residential sexual harassment and shares the
current statistics regarding the prevalence of sexual harassment in housing.
Mining court filings brought by the United States Attorney General alleging
residential sexual harassment, Part I exposes evidence of racialized sexual
harassment in housing and connects both the existence of the harassment and
its omission from the larger case narrative to the cultural acceptance of the
myth of the Black "Jezebel." Part III probes the prevailing "dirty old man"
narrative in both scholarship and case law and theorizes about its development,
charting the complete body of federal and state case law on residential sexual
harassment-a total of one hundred and two opinions 7-to assess whether and
how the "dirty old man" narrative has affected the judicial narrative. Part IV
explores why the prevailing "dirty old man" narrative is problematic,
identifying specific structural forces-legal rights, access, and generational
economic and racial hierarchies-that are in tension with the concept of the
"dirty old man." The Article concludes with a synthesis of the argument and
brief suggestions for where we may go from here to reconstruct the narrative in
a manner that meaningfully accounts for race.
By adopting the "dirty old man" narrative, scholars and advocates
acquiesce to the law's actual and perceived limitations. Adoption of the
standard narrative ignores the structural factors operating to perpetuate the
sexual harassment of Black women in rental housing. It disregards the way that
those factors have operated throughout American history to institutionalize the
disempowerment of Black women, especially in the domestic sphere. Unless
and until scholars and advocates integrate race into their case theory,
challenging individual and institutional racism set within and alongside sexism,
civil rights jurisprudence will stagnate at its current understanding. It will do no
more than recognize residential sexual harassment as an aberration
disconnected from structural racism (and sexism) embedded in America's past
and present. By naming and challenging the "dirty old man" narrative, this
15. Transcript of Jury Trial, Vol. 3 at 478, Hurl, No. 3:09-cv-00031-BSM (E.D. Ark. Nov. 18,
2010).
16. Transcript of Jury Trial, Vol. 2, supra note 13, at 154.
17. This data is current as of October 1,2015. See infra Section 111.B & Appendix A.
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Article issues a call to scholars and advocates to reconstruct the narrative to
integrate race into sexual harassment claims to push the boundaries of those
anti-discrimination laws.' 
8
I. SETTING THE STAGE: RESIDENTIAL SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Although the field of sexual harassment in housing is largely under-
researched and under-theorized,' 9 there are enough data to establish that poor
and vulnerable women fall prey to sexual harassment in housing at alarming
rates. 20 Yet, knowledge about the existence and prevalence of sexual
harassment in housing is still lacking. Further, the data that exists fails to
isolate statistics on the basis of race. Because context is critical to
understanding the problem of racialized sexual harassment in housing, this Part
defines residential sexual harassment and identifies the limited data set
exploring the problem.
A. Defining the Problem
Women are vulnerable to sexual harassment in housing, especially rental
housing, at every stage in the transaction, from accessing housing to repairs to
eviction. Sexual harassment can occur at any point in a rental transaction,
where it interferes with the terms, conditions or privileges of the housing or
makes the housing unavailable. 21 Regina Cahan identified five different
categories into which sexual harassment in housing usually falls: (1) abusive
remarks, (2) unsolicited sexual behavior, (3) solicitation of sexual behavior by
promise or award, (4) coercion of sexual activity by threat or punishment, and
(5) punishment upon rejection of sexual overtures.22 In other words, sexual
harassment may occur at the beginning (application for housing), middle (terms
and conditions of housing), or end (eviction from housing) of the rental
relationship. It may be in the form of a threat (i.e. "Perform this sexual act or 1
will evict you"), or a reward (i.e. "I will charge you $50 less per month if you
have sex with me"). It may involve, for example, unwanted sexual touching,
18. This Article focuses on naming and critiquing the standard narrative. It is just the beginning of
a discussion on reconstructing the narrative. More empirical work must be done to assess the phases of
litigation where race falls out of the narrative, i.e. investigation, pleading, introduction of evidence, or
judicial narrative. Possible litigation strategies-including pleading multiple claims of discrimination or
accounting for racism in seeking damages, for example-should also be fully analyzed.
19. See Maggie E. Reed, Linda L. Collinsworth & Louise F. Fitzgerald, There's No Place Like
Home: Sexual Harassment of Low Income Women in Housing, II PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 439, 439
(2005) ("Although sexual harassment in the workplace has received considerable attention, harassment
in rental housing is a virtually unresearched phenomenon, despite informal data that it is widespread.").
20. See id.; see also infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012).
22. Regina Cahan, Comment, Home is No Haven: An Analysis of Sexual Harassment in Housing,
1987 Wis. L. REV. 1061, 1064-65.
2016]
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intimidating sexual advances, or withholding of repairs absent a sexual
encounter.
B. The Prevalence of Sexual Harassment in Housing and Lack of Data on Its
Intersection with Race
There is limited data about sexual harassment in rental housing. 23 In 1987,
Regina Cahan first drew attention to the problem of sexual harassment in
housing and provided preliminary data on its prevalence. 24 Cahan surveyed 150
fair housing centers across the country to "determine the number of sexual
harassment complaints received and to analyze specific characteristics of the
complaints" for each year from 1980 to 1985 and in total prior to 1980.25 Of the
eighty-seven centers that responded to Cahan's survey with usable
information, 26 sixty-five percent (fifty-seven centers) reported receiving
complaints of sexual harassment in housing, reporting a total of 288 incidents
of sexual harassment in housing.27 Applying the reporting rate used by the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) for sexual harassment in the
workplace (two to four percent), Cahan speculated that 6,818 to 15,000 cases of
sexual harassment in housing may have occurred during the period she
surveyed.28 Although Cahan solicited quantitative and qualitative data, she did
not report any data specific to the race of the victims or perpetrators.
Since 1987, other scholars and advocates have weighed in, crafting similar
surveys and breaking down the legal and practical barriers to successful sexual
harassment suits under the Fair Housing Act.29 In 2005, the National Law
23. Residential sexual harassment is, like other forms of sexual assault, underreported, making the
gathering and analysis of data difficult. Cahan, supra note 22, at 1067 (identifying factors that deter
women from reporting sexual harassment in housing); Aric K. Short, Slaves for Rent: Sexual
Harassment in Housing as Involuntary Servitude, 86 NEB. L. REV. 838, 848 n.57 (2008) (positing that a
lack of education on housing rights, combined with fear of retaliation or blacklisting, likely limited the
accuracy of Cahan's count); see also Theresa Keeley, Landlord Sexual Assault and Rape of Tenants:
Survey Findings and Advocacy Approaches, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 441, 442 (2006) (citing data that
sexual assaults and rapes are underreported crimes).
24. Cahan, supra note 22, at 1061.
25. Id. at 1066.
26. Ninety-six centers responded to the survey, which is a sixty-four percent response rate. The data
from five agencies was excluded because they did not distinguish sexual harassment from sex
discrimination and the data from an additional four centers was excluded because those centers
responded by providing referrals to other agencies. Id. at 1066.
27. Id.
28. Id at 1069 (citing U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
WORKPLACE: IS IT A PROBLEM? 71 (1981)).
29. See Housing and Sexual Violence: Overview of National Survey, NAT'L SEXUAL VIOLENCE
RESOURCE CTR. (Jan. 2010),
http://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/Publications NSVRC_Reports Housing-and-sexual-violence-
overview-of-national-survey.pdf; National Survey ofAdvocates on Sexual Violence, Housing & Violence
Against Women Act, NAT'L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RESOURCE CTR. (2011),
http://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/Publications NSVRCReports National-survey-of-advocates-
on-sexual-violence-housing-and-VAWA.pdf; Adams, supra note 7, at 19-20; Beverly Balos, A Man's
Home is His Castle: How the Law Shelters Domestic Violence and Sexual Harassment, 23 ST. LOUIS U.
[Vol. 27:227
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Center on Homelessness and Poverty surveyed rape crisis centers to identify
patterns regarding sexual assault and rape in housing, receiving 112 surveys
from advocates in twenty-nine states. 30 In interpreting the results of that survey,
Theresa Keeley found that advocates reported a total of 161 reported sexual
assaults or rapes by landlords, property owners, or property managers. 31 Fifty-
eight percent of the rape crisis centers that responded to the survey reported
that at least one client reported sexual assault or rape by a landlord, property
owner, or manager. 32 The National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty
study asked no questions specifically related to race.
Data maintained by the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) and advocacy organizations on sex discrimination and
sexual assault in housing provides further insight for understanding the
prevalence of residential sexual harassment. HUD, for example, reports that in
Fiscal Year 2013, it received 8,368 complaints of housing discrimination.
33
Twenty-eight percent of the complaints (2,337) alleged race discrimination. 34
Twelve percent of the complaints (985) alleged discrimination on the basis of
sex, which is the primary means of alleging sexual harassment, and eleven
percent (928) alleged retaliation as the basis of the complaint.35 This data is
relevant because sexual harassment allegations brought pursuant to the Fair
Housing Act generally arise under one or both of those theories. 36 Although the
report explicitly acknowledges that "complaints may contain multiple bases,"
37
it is impossible to tell from the report whether a complainant alleged sex
discrimination and race discrimination. Therefore, there is no way to assess the
relationship between race and sexual harassment.
Data gathered from advocacy organizations similarly provide context for a
conversation about sexual harassment in housing. In 2009, the National Sexual
Violence Resource Center distributed an online survey to advocates to gather
PUB. L. REV. 77, 79-80 (2004); Nicole A. Forkenbrock Lindemyer, Sexual Harassment on the Second
Shift: The Misfit Application of Title VII Employment Standards to Title VIII Housing Cases, 18 LAW &
INEQ. 351, 363-68 (2000); Keeley, supra note 23; William Litt et al., Recent Developments: Sexual
Harassment Hits Home, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 227, 231-44 (1992); Reed et al., supra note 19, at 439
n. 1; Robert G. Schwemm & Rigel C. Oliveri, A New Look at Sexual Harassment Under the Fair
Housing Act: The Forgotten Role of§ 3604(c), 2002 WIS. L. REV. 771, 774-86; Short, supra note 23, at
848 n.57; Deborah Zalesne, The Intersection of Socioeconomic Class and Gender in Hostile Housing
Environment Claims Under Title VIII: Who Is The Reasonable Person?, 38 B.C. L. REV. 861 (1997).
30. Keeley, supra note 23, at 443.
31. Id. If one applied the MSBP reporting percentage applied in Cahan's study (two to four
percent), it would suggest that 4,025 to 8,050 tenants were victims of sexual assault or rape at the hands
of their landlords, property managers, or property owners.
32. Id.
33. Annual Report on Fair Housing, FY 2012-2013, U.S. DEP'T Hous. & URB. DEV. 18 (Nov. 7,
2014), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=2012- 13annreport.pdf.
34. Id. at 19.
35. Id.
36. See infra Part 111.
37. Annual Report on Fair Housing, FY2012-2013, supra note 33, at 19 n. 1.
2016]
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data on the intersection between sexual violence, housing, and homelessness. 38
After receiving responses from 239 respondents from thirty-three states and one
U.S. territory, the organizations identified qualitative themes regarding tenants'
risk of sexual harassment and assault in their homes. For the purposes of this
Article, the most important themes identified are the landlords' lack of response
in making residences physically safe and secure, a lack of awareness and
sensitivity about sexual violence among property owners and landlords, and
sexual exploitation of tenants by landlords.39 A follow up survey, the National
Survey of Advocates on Sexual Violence, Housing & Violence Against
Women Act, was designed to focus primarily on sexual violence of those in
public and subsidized housing.4 ° Although the survey did not exclusively relate
to landlord sexual harassment, its findings are instructive. When asking
advocates what forms of sexual violence victims or their children have faced
while living in public or Section 8 housing, for example, nearly half of the
advocates reported hearing claims of sexual harassment.
41
While all of the data identified herein are instructive, there is no national
study or statistic that breaks down sexual harassment by race. In that way, each
of the data operates under the assumption that there is a standard victim of
sexual harassment in housing. There is no data that explicitly focuses on
racialized sexual harassment and no useful information breaking down the
different experiences of women facing residential sexual harassment on the
basis of race.42
II. EXPOSING RACIALIZED SEXUAL HARASSMENT AT HOME AND GROUNDING
IT IN AMERICA'S HISTORICAL RACIAL MYTH OF THE BLACK "JEZEBEL"
The premise of this Article is that the Black woman's experience of
residential sexual harassment is missing from the prevailing "dirty old man"
narrative, and that such an omission is problematic because it perpetuates the
38. Housing and Sexual Violence: Overview of National Survey, supra note 29, at 1. The survey
was undertaken in partnership with the Victim Rights Law Center, the National Sexual Assault Coalition
Resource Sharing Project, the Louisiana Foundation Against Sexual Assault, the University of New
Hampshire, and Pennsylvania Community Legal Services. See id.
39. Id. at 3.
40. National Survey of Advocates on Sexual Violence, Housing & Violence Against Women Act,
supra note 29, at 1. The follow up survey was undertaken in partnership with the National Alliance to
End Sexual Violence, the Victims Rights Law Center, and the National Organization of Sisters of Color
Ending Sexual Assault. Id.
41. Id. at 5.
42. The data sets suffer from additional limitations. The HUD data, for example, is both over-
inclusive and under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive because not all sex discrimination is sexual
harassment and not all challenges under Sections 804(b) and 818 allege sexual harassment. It is under-
inclusive because it accounts only for formal complaints filed with HUD and its affiliates. Cahan's
survey and the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty survey are under-inclusive in that
they limit the respondent pool to those individuals accessing services from fair housing organizations or
rape crisis centers, respectively.
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silence of Black women experiencing sexual subjugation in the private sphere
and constrains a larger conversation about the structural forces that perpetuate
such abuse. This Part uncovers testimonial evidence of racialized sexual
harassment that individual Black women experienced in housing. It then
connects the existence of racialized sexual harassment in housing, and the
omission of that evidence from the primary legal narrative of the case, to the
legacy of slavery, specifically the cultural acceptance of the Black woman as
sexually lascivious (the "Jezebel" myth).
A. Methodology and Data
Mining public docket filings from sexual harassment cases brought by the
Attorney General of the United States under the federal Fair Housing Act, this
Part exposes testimonial evidence of racialized sexual harassment. Although
sexual harassment claims brought by the Attorney General represent only a
subset of relevant cases, courts have recognized the Attorney General "as the
guardian of public interests under the Fair Housing Act.",43 With that in mind,
and recognizing the Attorney General's unique position to seek redress for a
group of persons or based on a pattern or practice of discrimination,44 the cases
brought by the United States offer insight into the role of race in residential
sexual harassment claims.45 They also provide a springboard for analysis of the
invocation of the "dirty old man" narrative by scholars and advocates and set
the stage for review of the jurisprudence that has developed in response to
residential sexual harassment claims, all of which are investigated more fully in
later Parts.
The Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Housing and Civil
Enforcement Section is the arm of the administration primarily responsible for
enforcing the federal Fair Housing Act.46 On its website, the Housing and Civil
43. United States v. Katz, No. 10 Civ. 3335, 2011 WL 2175787, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2011).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a) (2012). The Attorney General has authority to bring suit under the Fair
Housing Act when she "has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged
in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights granted by [the Fair
Housing Act], or that any group of persons has been denied any of the rights granted by [the Fair
Housing Act] and such denial raises an issue of general public importance." Id. She may also bring suit
in certain circumstances based on a complaint filed with the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(o).
45. This is not the first time that cases brought by the Attorney General via the Housing and Civil
Enforcement Section have been used to analyze the state of residential sexual harassment and the related
jurisprudence. See Reed et al., supra note 19, at 439 n. I (analyzing data drawn from sexual harassment
cases filed by the Housing and Civil Enforcement Section of the Civil Rights Division of the United
States Department of Justice); Short, supra note 23, at 839-41 (relying on the trial transcript of United
States v. Veal, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (W.D. Mo. 2004) (No. 02-0720-CR-W-DW), a case brought by the
Housing and Civil Enforcement Section of the Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice).
46. See Housing and Civil Enforcement Overview, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/housing-and-civil-enforcement-section-overview (last visited June 26, 2015).
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) also has enforcement authority. See 42
U.S.C. § 3608 (2012). From 2008 to 2014, 1 was a Trial Attorney in the Housing and Civil Enforcement
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Enforcement Section maintains a list of its current and former cases, sorted by
protected class.47 To analyze the universe of relevant cases, I looked at the
cases listed on that site maintained under the heading "Discrimination Based
Upon Sex." For those cases involving sexual harassment in housing, I accessed
docket entries publicly-available on PACER and/or Bloomberg Law related to
those cases. I pulled and reviewed docket entries likely to include testimony
from women experiencing sexual harassment in housing (i.e. Exhibits,
Affidavits, Deposition testimony, Trial testimony, etc.). 48 I also reviewed
filings establishing the lawyer's narrative about the case (i.e. Complaint,
Motion for Summary Judgment, Trial Brief, opening and closing statements,
etc.) for the next Section, which evidence a near complete omission of race,
even in cases where the testimony suggested racialized sexual harassment. To
ensure I was considering the entire relevant universe, I also did searches on
Westlaw and Bloomberg Law to identify any other cases brought by the
Attorney General asserting residential housing discrimination, then I followed
the same procedure to identify relevant cases and narratives.4 9
It is helpful to begin with the statistics. According to information publicly
available, the Attorney General has filed forty-two cases alleging sex
discrimination on the basis of sexual harassment in violation of the Fair
Housing Act. 50 Of the thirty-eight complaints that broke down the claims into
specific sections of the Fair Housing Act, twenty-nine pled a violation of
Section of the Civil Rights Division. I litigated cases under the federal Fair Housing Act, including
sexual harassment cases.
47. See Housing and Civil Enforcement Section Cases, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/housing-and-civil-enforcement-section-cases- I (last visited June 26, 2015).
48. 1 concentrated specifically on direct quotations from women experiencing racialized sexual
harassment, rather than allegations filtered through the lawyer. As a White woman who writes about the
loss of the Black woman's voice in discrimination cases, I am particularly attentive to the risk of
inappropriately speaking for Black women. As a former civil rights lawyer who litigated some of the
cases cited herein, this Article is meant to highlight the importance of remaining client-centered in legal
representation. For a discussion on the history and development of the client-centered representation
model, see Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand. The Plural Values of Client-Centered
Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2006). There is a reality of White men and women litigating
discrimination cases on behalf of people of color, as I have done throughout much of my career. While I
take issue with the historical and structural forces that have created that disparity, this Article attempts to
remind all lawyers, and most specifically White lawyers, to listen to their clients' stories and goals and
not ignore the impact of race, even in the face of a standard stock story that excludes race.
49. The results of this project are current through July 1, 2015. Although the number of publicly-
available filings online is limited, both by date and in scope, documents provided sufficient information
to support the claims made in this paper. A complete review of all filings in residential sexual
harassment cases would shed enormous light on the problems identified herein. In a future project, I
envision collecting a larger universe of relevant filings through Freedom of Information Act requests
and courts' paper files to undertake a more thorough quantitative and qualitative analysis. Even that
project, however, will fail to capture stories ofracialized sexual harassment that drop out of the narrative
before court papers are ever filed. Analyzing that possibility, along with its resultant impacts, is the
subject of yet another future project.
50. This count includes a small number of cases, listed on the Department of Justice's website, in
which the Attorney General did not file her own litigation, but weighed in on the case in some capacity.
It may not capture every case where the United States filed an amicus brief or otherwise intervened in
the case. See Housing and Civil Enforcement Section Cases, supra note 47.
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Section 3604(a);51 thirty-seven pled a violation of Section 3604(b); 52 thirty-one
pled a violation of 3604(c); 53 and thirty-five alleged a violation of Section
3617.54 Thirty-two complaints alleged discrimination based only on sex.
55
Other complaints asserted claims for discrimination on the basis of sex, along
with familial status, race, disability, color, and/or national origin.56 Five of the
sexual harassment complaints brought by the Attorney General asserted both
sex discrimination and race discrimination.57 Nothing in any of those five
complaints, however, explicitly alleges facts suggesting an intersection of
sexism and racism.
58
51. Section 3604(a) makes it unlawful to "refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide
offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." 42
U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012).
52. Section 3604(b) makes it unlawful to "discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions,
or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection
therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b)
(2012).
53. Section 3604(c) makes it unlawful to
make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or
advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference,
limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or
national origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012).
54. Section 3617 makes it unlawful to
coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or
on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or
encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected
by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of [the Fair Housing Act].
42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2012).
55. I did not consider any of the seventeen complaints where the allegation of discrimination on the
basis of sex did not include allegations of sexual harassment. See Housing and Civil Enforcement
Section Cases, supra note 47.
56. For the most part, where complaints alleged more than one basis of discrimination, the facts
giving rise to the allegations were separate and distinct from one another.
57. Second Amended Complaint, United States v. Harris, No. 4:09-cv-01859 (E. D. Mo. Oct. 1I,
2011); Complaint, United States v. Willis, No. 3:1 l-cv-200 (E.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2011); Complaint for
Monetary, Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, and Demand for Trial by Jury, United States v. Morgan,
No. 4:07-cv-125 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 27, 2008); First Amended Complaint, United States v. Wingo, No.
8:01-cv-00504 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2001); Complaint, United States v. Krueger, No. 98-cv-0886 (E.D.
Wis. Sept. 8, 1998.
58. Second Amended Complaint, United States v. Harris, No. 4:09-cv-01859 (E. D. Mo. Oct. 11,
2011); Complaint, United States v. Willis, No. 3:1 l-cv-200 (E.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2011); Complaint for
Monetary, Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, and Demand for Trial by Jury, United States v. Morgan,
No. 4:07-cv-125 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 27, 2008); First Amended Complaint, United States v. Wingo, No.
8:01-cv-00504 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2001); Complaint, United States v. Krueger, No. 98-cv-0886 (E.D.
Wis. Sept. 8, 1998. But see Complaint at 10, United States v. Madrid, No. 1:04-cv-00683 (D.N.M.
June 17, 2004) (Attorney General alleged both sex discrimination and disability discrimination, alleging
that "[djefendants have subjected tenants with mental disabilities to the following discriminatory
conduct: (a) unwelcome sexual and/or physical harassment").
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B. Evidence of Racialized Sexual Harassment
Race is generally absent from the prevailing narrative of residential sexual
harassment and the jurisprudence that has developed.59 Such is the case for the
majority of residential sexual harassment cases brought by the Attorney
General. With the exception of the handful of cases set forth below, there is
almost complete exclusion of race from sexual harassment complaints and the
legal narrative surrounding them. Where race is part of the complaint or legal
narrative, there is little to suggest that the race of the victims or perpetrators
changed the nature of the sexual harassment alleged. For example, in United
States v. Bathrick, the government described its Fair Housing pattern or
practice case theory: "Over the years, Bathrick has repeatedly rented to women
desperate to find housing, and then, fully aware of their limited housing
options, demanded sexual favors from them or otherwise sexually harassed
them. This predatory conduct has harmed each of his victims." 60 Unlike the
majority of the residential sexual harassment complaints filed by the Attorney
General, court filings in Bathrick do provide racial identifiers for the defendant
(White) and the twelve alleged victims (six were Black). 61 After the initial
racial identification, however, the publicly-available docket is void of
information or allegations related to race. The resulting implication is that the
sexual harassment experienced by each woman was generally uniform; race
played no role in the women's experience of sexual harassment.
62
While the legal narrative advanced omits a discussion of race, a searching
inquiry into case filings surfaces testimonial evidence of racialized sexual
harassment. Hawecker v. Sorenson, a class action and pattern or practice case
alleging sexual harassment in residential rental units, for example, exposes
evidence of racialized sexual harassment. At least four women in Hawecker
testified in depositions that the defendant invoked racial stereotypes in
connection with his sexual harassment and/or sexual assault.63 One female
tenant asserted that the defendant, before putting his mouth on her breast, told
her he wanted to suck her breasts, which he described as "big and black., 64 And
when she asked why he sexually assaulted her, he told her "I like your black
titties and I want you to have sex with me and then I won't evict you .... 65
59. See infra Section III.A.
60. United States' Statement of the Case at 2, United States v. Bathrick, No. 0:04-cv-00940 (D.
Minn. May 7, 2007).
61. Id.at3-6.
62. Id.
63. Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, Exhibit 9, at 6-7, Hawecker v. Sorenson, No. 1:10-
cv-00085 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2010), ECF No. 22-9; id. at Exhibit 7, at 7, ECF No. 22-7; id. at Exhibit 8,
at 7 & 14, ECF No. 22-8; id. at Exhibit 10, at 8, ECF No. 22-10.
64. Id. at Exhibit 7,, at 7.
65. Id. at 24.
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Two other Black women and one Hispanic woman testified to similar
statements, all in connection with sexual harassment.66
Female loan applicants made similar claims in United States v. First
National Bank of Pontotoc, a case alleging that a bank manager's sexual
harassment of female applicants constituted sex discrimination in violation of
67the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Fair Housing Act. At least twenty-
seven victims in Pontotoc identified as African American, many of whom
averred racially-charged sexual harassment. For example, one woman
declared that the loan officer called her a "sexy little black thing," told her she
had a "big black vagina" and "soft black ass and breasts." 69 One declarant
asserted that the loan officer told her he liked to look at black women's
breasts70 and another asserted that he called her legs "good and brown."'7
In United States v. Mitchell, one former tenant testified in deposition that,
"[The defendant] will tell you that in a minute. He love black pussy but he
don't like black girls. He just likes to have sex with them." 72 That witness
further testified that Mr. Mitchell used his key to enter her apartment uninvited
on a number of occasions, offered her money for sex, and fondled himself in
front of her.73
In United States v. Gumbaytay, sworn declarations attached as exhibits to a
court-filed motion revealed several Black women's assertions that their race
was significant to the sexual harassment they experienced at the hands of their
property manager. Several women declared that the defendant, often while
offering a quid pro quo sexual exchange, expressed his sympathy with Black
women.74 And one declarant recalled the defendant saying that "I love my
66. Female tenants testified that, in connection with sexual harassment, Sorenson evoked racialized
language about their body parts, calling one woman a "big, beautiful black women with big breasts" and
telling another "I bet you have big, round, brown nipples." Id. at Exhibit 5, at 7, ECF No. 22-5; id. at
Exhibit 8, at 19.
67. Complaint, United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Pontotoc, 3:06-cv-00061 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 27,
2006); Second Amended Complaint, First Nat 'l Bank of Pontotoc, No. 3:06-cv-00061 (N.D. Miss. July
7, 2007).
68. Joint Stipulation Regarding Distribution of Settlement Fund at Affidavit Nos. 2-9, 11-24, 26-30,
First Nat'l Bank of Pontotoc, No. 3:06-cv-00061 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 19, 2008). The negotiated consent
decree provided a settlement fund for unidentified aggrieved women, in addition to providing specific
monetary damages for fifteen identified women. Although the public record does not provide
information about the race or allegations of the original fifteen women, the testimonial evidence in
Pontotoc is drawn from the request for disbursement of the settlement fund for an additional twenty-nine
identified women. Of the twenty-nine, twenty-seven identified as African American. Id.
69. Id. at Affidavit No. 2 7 4, 10, ECF No. 84-2.
70. Id. at Affidavit No. 6 12 ECF No. 84-6.
71. Id.atAffidavitNo. 15 4 ECFNo. 84-15.
72. Notice of Filing of Deposition Transcript of Kimberly Stubblefield at 30, United States v.
Mitchell, No. 1:07-cv-00150 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 18, 2008).
73. Id. at 32, 36, 39-40.
74. Plaintiff United States' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Gumbaytay's Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Evidence at Exhibit 4 3, United States v. Bahr, No. 2:08-cv-00573 (M.D. Ala.
Oct. 29, 2010); id. at Exhibit 5 7 4-5; id. at Exhibit 9 8.
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black sisters" and telling her that he liked Black "sisters with big butts" and
"liked to have sex with them from the back," propping them up with pillows. 75
The defendant in United States v. Hurt, discussed in the Introduction,
provides further evidence of racialized sexual harassment in housing. The
defendant landlord reported to one sexual harassment victim that he heard that
"black girls had good pussy"76 and encouraged another property manager in the
area to take advantage sexually of Black tenants, who can "show you a thing or
two for the rent."
77
Although this Part is primarily limited to cases brought by the Attorney
General of the United States, it is impossible, at this point, to ignore Chomicki
v. Wittekind, a case assessing a claim of residential sexual harassment under
Wisconsin's fair housing law.78 Two years after Ms. Chomicki began her
month-to-month tenancy in 1981, the defendant made explicit sexual advances
toward the plaintiff and threatened to raise her rent or evict her if she refused
his advances. When she failed to comply, he engaged in increasingly
intimidating harassment. First, he gave her notice to vacate. Then, he cursed her
when she sought to fight against an eviction. Finally, he "roamed through her
apartment building at all hours of the night accompanied by his guard dog.",7 9
Although the publicly-available court documents in Chomicki are silent as to
race, a contemporaneous article in the Milwaukee Journal revealed that Ms.
Chomicki was a "black mother of two young children" and, in making sexual
demands, the defendant allegedly told her, "All black women like it." 80
C. Cultural Acceptance of the "Black Jezebel" Myth Provides Justification for
Sexual Assault and Disregards the Resultant Suffering
The evidence of racialized sexual harassment in the cases set out above are
buried in exhibits attached to filings. They are found fleetingly in deposition
testimony or drawn from declarations submitted only after the case has been
resolved. Like the legal narrative in Hurt, discussed in the Introduction, race is
absent from the publicly-stated legal narratives advanced in Hawecker,
Pontotoc, Mitchell, and Gumbaytay. In Hawecker, the class action complaint
asserted sex discrimination and alleged that the "defendant has engaged in an
extraordinary pattern and practice of sexual harassment, targeting and
75. Id. at Exhibit 7 11, 12. Although Mr. Gumbaytay's race is not explicitly acknowledged in the
court documents, it appears from context that he also identified as Black.
76. Transcript of Jury Trial, Vol. 3, supra note 15, at 478.
77. Transcript of Jury Trial, Vol. 2, supra note 13, at 154.
78. Chomicki v. Wittekind, 128 Wis. 2d 188 (Ct. App. 1985).
79. Id. at 192. The use of a dog as an historic symbol of racial intimidation cannot be ignored. I will
return to Chomicki later in the Article. See infra Conclusion.
80. Suit Cites Sexual Harassment, MILWAUKEE J., Jul. 24, 1985, at lOB,
https://news.google.com/newspapers?id-n2MaAAAAIBAJ&sjid= ioEAAAAIBAJ&pg--3908%2C1255
42 (last visited June 24, 2015).
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exploiting female tenants and prospective tenants who are economically
vulnerable."'', The related United States' complaint in United States v.
Sorenson asserted sex discrimination and detailed the kinds of sexual
harassment its investigation revealed8 2 Neither complaint, however, directly or
indirectly mentioned race.8 3 Race is similarly absent from the narratives
84 85
advanced in Pontotoc and Mitchell. In Gumbaytay, the government alleged
that the sexual harassment took the form of offering to exchange rent for sexual
favors, 86 offering to pay for sex, and threatening not to do household
repairs. The harassment involved graphic verbal sexual advances,89 incessant
phone calls, 90 and unwanted sexual touching.91 Based on those allegations, the
complaint alleged a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of sex.
92
And yet neither the complaint nor other court filings establishing the
government's narrative explicitly mentioned race. Rather than focus the case on
the racialized sexual harassment, the government advanced a "dirty old man"
narrative, with a singular focus on the relationship between poverty and sexual
harassment. 
93
The stories of African American women subjected to sexual harassment in
the home have gone unnoticed both because the action itself is undertaken in
81. Class Action Complaint for Monetary, Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 6, Hawecker v.
Sorenson, No. 1: 10-cv-00085 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2010).
82. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, United States v. Sorenson, No. 1:11-00164 (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 25, 2011).
83. Class Action Complaint for Monetary, Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Hawecker, supra note
81; Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Sorenson, supra note 82.
84. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 67; Consent Decree, United States v. First Nat'l Bank
of Pontotoc, No. 3:06-cv-00061 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 7, 2007).
85. First Amended Complaint, United States v. Mitchell, 1:07-cv-00150 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 02,
2007); Joint Motion to Approve and Enter Consent Decree, Mitchell, 1:07-cv-00150 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 4,
2008).
86. Plaintiff United States' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Gumbaytay's Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Evidence, supra note 74, at Exhibit 7 8-9.
87. ld. at 11 9.
88. Id. atExhibit9 5.
89. Id. at Exhibit5 5; Exhibit I 14.
90. id. at Exhibit 1 12.
91. Id. at Exhibit2 7.
92. Complaint and Request for Jury Trial, United States v. Bahr, No. 2:08-cv-00573 (M.D. Ala.
Apr. 29, 2010).
93. It is important to recognize, however, that the Attorney General has different goals and
responsibilities than a private lawyer representing a private plaintiff. Cases brought by the Attorney
General under the Fair Housing Act and other statutes are brought on behalf of the United States, not
individual plaintiffs. While the statute permits recovery for persons aggrieved by the defendant's
discriminatory conduct, see 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d)(l)(B) (2012), the aggrieved persons are not, unless they
intervene, parties to the action or represented by counsel in the action. See United States v. Gumbaytay,
276 F.R.D. 671, 674 (M.D. Ala. 2011). Understanding that relationship must underscore analysis and
critique of the government's actions and choices, where there are different ethical rules governing their
relationship to aggrieved persons than would exist in a traditional attorney-client relationship. Further,
the majority of cases cited herein brought by the Attorney General are "pattern or practice" cases
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3614. Legal strategy may, of course, be constrained when one must
construct a coherent case theory from disparate experiences.
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the private sphere94 and because cultural stereotypes and tropes have made the
Black victim invisible. While the hidden nature of the transaction and action
operate similarly for all women experiencing sexual harassment in housing, the
national cultural myth of the sexually insatiable Black woman makes African
American women more vulnerable to residential sexual harassment and then
silences their resistance by providing 'justification" for the abuse.
Since the days of slavery, African American women have been confronted
with the myth that Black women are promiscuous and hyper-sexual, often
referred to as the Jezebel myth. 95 Born of the tension between Victorian notions
of chastity and weakness and the commoditization of enslaved Black women,
the Jezebel myth "created space for white moral superiority by justifying the
brutality of Southern white men" 96 and operated to disavow that Black women
could ever be victims "in this arrangement." 97 The institutional acceptance of
the Jezebel myth leads to dual outcomes: excusing the sexual abuse of Black
women and silencing resistance.
98
The institution of slavery depended on the justification of the sexual
harassment of, sexual abuse of, and forced sexual reproduction by enslaved
Black women.99 By 1660, laws defined a child's status as free or slave
according to his or her mother's status.' 00 In other words, a child born to a slave
was a slave. When, in 1807, the transatlantic slave trade was abolished, 10' birth
of a child by a slave woman became the cheapest and easiest way to reinforce a
slaveholder's workforce. Slave owners subjected enslaved women to forced,
94. See Balos, supra note 29, at 87 ("Historically, social, political, and legal institutions have
supported male control of women through violence. One of the most powerful societal values that has
reinforced the vulnerability of women to domestic violence has been the concept of the private, domestic
sphere.").
95. See MELISSA HARRIS-PERRY, SISTER CITIZEN: SHAME, STEREOTYPES, AND BLACK WOMEN IN
AMERICA 53-69 (2011); Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539, 570; Dorothy E.
Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, I AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 11-12
(1993). Black women, of course, are not the only women subjected to cultural myths that increase their
vulnerability to harassment or subjugation. Cf Coleman, supra note 8, at 404 ("In addition to the
typical understanding of their vulnerability, however, Latina immigrant workers may also experience
subjugation based upon cultural narratives that inform their experiences both at home and at work.").
96. HARRIS-PERRY, supra note 95, at 55.
97. Id. at 56. Cf Brenda V. Smith, Uncomfortable Places, Close Spaces: Female Correctional
Workers' Sexual Interactions with Men and Boys in Custody, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1690, 1700, 1722
(2012) (recognizing multiple cultural myths and ideas about gender and race that impact social views
about sexual assault, including that Black women are viewed as "loose and immoral" and that all men,
including young boys, are assumed to "always desire sex, regardless of circumstances").
98. HARRIS-PERRY, supra note 95, at 56; see also Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual
Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1467, 1468 (1992) (noting that "race cannot be separated from gender
in Black women's lives" because "[r]ace in many ways both shapes and [sic] kinds of gender
subordination Black women experience and limits the opportunities to successfully challenge it").
99. See Adrienne D. Davis, Slavery and the Roots of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 457,464 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) (deeming
slavery as "widespread, institutionalized, state-sanctioned sexual harassment implemented in perhaps its
most corrupt form").
100. Wilma King, Childhood, in BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA 203 (Darlene Clark Hine ed., 2d ed.
2005).
101. Deborah Gray White, Motherhood, in BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA, supra note 100, at 399.
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coerced, or encouraged coupling to create more children and maintain or
increase his slave property. ° 2  The Jezebel myth provided his moral
justification.
It is the national cultural acceptance of the Jezebel myth that has
perpetuated the willful ignorance of the sexual abuse of Black women across
generations. The Black women's testimony in Hawecker, Pontotoc, Mitchell,
and Hurt is clear evidence that the Jezebel myth is alive and well in the
perpetrators' justification for the sexual harassment of Black women. In
Hawecker, Pontotoc, and Mitchell the vulgar descriptions of and interest in the
very "Blackness" of the women's bodies is drawn directly from the myth of a
hyper-sexual Black woman. Even in cases of intra-racial discrimination like
Gumbaytay, the Jezebel myth is evident in the sexually harassing conduct.
1°3
Further, the evidence in Hurt and Chomicki establish that the defendant found
justification in his actions because he believed that Black women "like it."
And yet, race was absent from the legal narrative employed to prosecute
each of these actions. The omission of the racialized sexual harassment from
the overarching narrative does nothing to dispel the Jezebel myth. In fact, it
risks perpetuating the invisibility of a particular victim of sexual assault and
discounting her suffering. It is possible to argue, in fact, that it is the ubiquitous
acceptance of the Jezebel myth that sits at the heart of the exclusion of race
from narratives of residential sexual harassment.
III. THE PREVAILING "DIRTY OLD MAN" NARRATIVE
The previous Part exposed testimonial evidence of racialized sexual
harassment in housing and suggested that, even in the face of such evidence,
102. See id. ("Enslavers achieved this high rate of fertility through the use of verbal
encouragement, subtle manipulation, and overt coercion."); Sharla M. Fett, Childbirth, in BLACK
WOMEN IN AMERICA, supra note 100, at 199 (discussing the psychological damage of forced unions
between slaves); Kathleen Thompson, Sexual Harassment, in BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA, supra note
100, at 113; Crenshaw, supra note 98, at 1469 ("Forced sexual access to Black women was
institutionalized in slavery and was central to its reproduction.").
103. Although intra-group racialized sexual harassment presents different issues for Black women
than sexual harassment by a White perpetrator, it remains a unique brand of sexual harassment that
should not be excluded from the legal narrative advanced. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1241, 1243-44 (1991) (discussing how, because of the historical experience of Black men, the Black
woman's experience of sexual harassment is omitted from the cultural understanding of her sexual
assault). In fact, some scholars discuss how pervasive silence has become a cultural norm in the Black
community when a Black woman is sexually assaulted by a Black man. See Crenshaw, supra note 98, at
1472 ("[T]he pervasive silence about this issue in the Black community is grounded in fears that
speaking about sexual abuse will reinforce negative racial stereotypes about Blacks in general and about
Black men in particular."); see also Patricia A. Broussard, Black Women's Post-Slavery Silence
Syndrome: A Twenty-First Century Remnant of Slavery, Jim Crow, and Systemic Racism-Who Will Tell
Her Stories, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 373, 375-76 (2013) ("The muted tongues of Black women
have protected Black men because the women do not want their voices to be an instrument that further
neuters Black men, while White men have been empowered by the silence of the American justice
system.").
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the "dirty old man" narrative prevails. This Part establishes just how pervasive
the "dirty old man" narrative is by engaging in thorough analysis of the body of
scholarship on residential sexual harassment and the universe of state and
federal case law addressing such claims. There are two distinct elements to this
Part. First, it introduces the primary avenues of legal redress for residential
sexual harassment and provides a brief introduction to the methodology of the
case law research. Second, it sets out the current state of the literature on the
topic and tracks how both scholars and courts have advanced the "dirty old
man" narrative by focusing on two component parts of residential sexual
harassment: (1) the economically vulnerable victim, and (2) sexual harassment
as an invasion of the sanctity of the home.
A. Residential Sexual Harassment in the Law
The primary legal avenue for bringing a residential sexual harassment
challenge in court is the federal Fair Housing Act and analogous state and local
statutes.'0 4 Apart from federal, state, and local fair housing laws, plaintiffs have
sought relief for sexual harassment in housing under various legal theories,
including sexual battery,'0 5 assault and battery, 0 6 intentional infliction of
emotional distress,'0 7 tortious interference with contract, 0 8 breach of covenant
of quiet use and enjoyment, 0 9 and unlawful entry."10 Scholars have also
proposed using the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against involuntary
servitude as a means of legal redress for sexual harassment in housing"' and
instituting an implied warranty of freedom from sexual harassment." 2 The
most frequently cited legal basis for a claim of sexual harassment in housing,
however, remains the federal Fair Housing Act and its state and local analogs.
Under the Fair Housing Act, complainants have more than one avenue for
seeking relief. One may file an administrative complaint with HUD 113 or may
file a civil action in a United States federal district court or state court.114
Further, upon making certain findings, the Secretary of HUD may file a
104. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006).
105. Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
106. Brillhart v. Sharp, No. 4:CV-07-1121, 2008 WL 2857713 (M.D. Pa. July 21, 2008).
107. Cavalieri-Conway v. L. Butterman & Assocs., 992 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
108. Id.
109. Salisbury v. Hickman, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (E.D. Cal. 2013).
110. Id.; see also Cahan, supra note 22, at 1083-87 (cataloguing techniques for challenging sexual
harassment at home, including issuing a counterclaim in an eviction action, asserting an unfair trade
practice, seeking redress under real estate licensing laws, or asserting state law actions, including assault
and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, trespass, invasion of right to privacy and
constructive eviction).
111. Short, supra note 23.
112. Theresa Keeley, An Implied Warranty of Freedom from Sexual Harassment: The Solution for
Harassed Tenants Where the Fair Housing Act Has Failed, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 397 (2005).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (2006).
114. ld. § 3613.
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Secretary-initiated complaint in federal district court" 1 5 or the Attorney General
may file a claim alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination in federal
district court." 
6
The jurisprudence on residential sexual harassment-a total of one hundred
and two state and federal opinions-was initiated by Shellhammer v. Lewallen
in 1983.117 In Shellhammer, the court found that sexual harassment is
cognizable as sex discrimination under the Fair Housing Act."18 In addition to
setting the stage for sexual harassment claims, Shellhammer has had lasting
impact on development of the jurisprudence because of its absolute reliance on
Title VII jurisprudence analyzing sexual harassment in employment.
Shellhammer's application of Title VIl's strict "severe or pervasive" standard
for establishing a hostile environment claim ignores the difference between
sexual harassment in the workplace and sexual harassment in the home.
Although scholars have raised significant concerns about the strict application
of Title VII sexual harassment law to allegations of sexual harassment under
Title VII, 119 courts have generally followed the legal structure set forth by the
Shellhammer court. 120 Shellhammer symbolizes the way that the judiciary has
assessed residential sexual harassment as a standard claim with a narrow vision
of the kind of sexual harassment, the victim of sexual harassment, and the
impact of sexual harassment.'
2
'
B. More Methodology and Data
To collect the universe of state and federal court opinions addressing
residential sexual harassment, 1 22 searched online engines (Lexis and Westlaw)
in the search form for all state and federal law. The results included several
hundred opinions, many of which arose under employment discrimination laws
115. Id. § 3610.
116. Id. § 3614. The Attorney General may initiate a suit whenever she
has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or
practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights granted by this subchapter, or
that any group of persons has been denied any of the rights granted by this subchapter and
such denial raises an issue of general public importance.
Id.
117. Shellhammer v. Lewallen, 4 Equal Opportunity Housing Rep. (P-H) 15,472 (W.D. Ohio
1983), aff'd, 770 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1985) (unpublished table decision).
118. Id.
119. See infra Section III.C.
120. Several scholarly articles carefully consider the history of the Fair Housing Act's
jurisprudence and therefore, I do not delve deeply into the analysis here. For an in-depth analysis of the
Shellhammer case, see Cahan, supra note 22, at 1075-81. For an historical look at sexual harassment
under the Fair Housing Act and the relationship between Title VII and Title VIII, see Schwemm &
Oliveri, supra note 29, at 774-86.
121. For a more in-depth discussion of the judicial narrative of the residential sexual harassment
jurisprudence, see infra Section III.C.
122. It was actually three fabulous research assistants-Briana Carlson, Aabru Madni, and Liz
Lehman-who undertook the bulk of this work. I could not have captured the entire universe of case law
or broken it down so intelligently without them.
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or other statutes or common law. After weeding out the cases that did not
involve allegations of sexual harassment in housing, I was left with one
hundred and two opinions. 123 1 then created a chart as a repository for the
standard information I wanted to gather from the court opinions, including case
name; citation/court/case number; posture for order; causes of action;
implication of Title VII; sanctity of the home; vulnerability of victim; race; and
other.124 1 read each court opinion and charted the data.'
25
Electronic searches revealed one hundred and two state and federal court
opinions arising from allegations of residential sexual harassment., 6 Nearly
half of the opinions explicitly cited to Title VII or the analogous state
employment statute to guide their analysis under Title VIII, and several more
cited to Title VII case law as precedent, 27 most frequently when assessing a
hostile environment sexual harassment claim.128 Courts' reliance on Title VII
123. To create the most complete list of cases dealing with sexual harassment in housing, we ran a
different search in each database. Beginning with Westlaw, my first research assistant, Aabru Madni, ran
the following search in "All State and Federal" cases: (sy,di("Housing") & "sexual harassment"). The
search returned more than 500 cases, only some of which involved claims of residential sexual
harassment. My second research assistant, Briana Carlson, ran a slightly more expanded search in Lexis
(Housing & "sexual harassment"). That search turned up additional opinions touching on sexual
harassment in housing. After I did a thorough read of each case, I omitted certain cases that did not
involve allegations of residential sexual harassment. As I read the cases, I also checked the citations
within one case against the chart to make sure that we had not excluded any court opinions. Where the
pulled court opinion suggested that another opinion might exist (i.e. the search revealed a circuit court
opinion that referenced a trial court opinion), I looked for the additional opinion. That analysis turned up
several additional cases. After charting those cases, I asked my final research assistant, Liz Lehman, to
recreate the chart that I created with her own analysis of the cases. I also asked her to recreate the
searches to ensure that we had the most complete listing possible. Her search turned up an additional
handful of cases. The count is current as of October 1, 2015, and does not include unpublished cases in
landlord-tenant court where sex discrimination or sexual harassment was raised as a defense to eviction.
124. A pared down version of that chart is attached as Appendix A to this Article.
125. 1 did not limit the search or data-gathering to cases alleging residential sexual harassment
under anti-discrimination law, although the great majority of cases did make such an allegation. Because
the court opinions did not universally name the causes of action, I did not include that data in the
Article.
126. 1 query whether the fact that Black women and other women of color are disproportionally
subjected to residential sexual harassment, see infra notes 158-160 and accompanying text, is itself a
determining factor in the paucity of written court opinions, in that cases may not be filed or may not
warrant a written decision.
127. Several court opinions included in the total count solely involved procedural matters, where
the underlying case related to residential sexual harassment, but the court opted not to engage in analysis
of the substance of the anti-discrimination law itself.
128. Other scholars have suitably addressed the problems with a wholesale adoption of Title Vil
into Title VIII. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text. I will not rehash that analysis. It is
worth noting, however, that courts are not the only ones to apply an assessment of sexual harassment in
employment to sexual harassment in housing. In addition to the obvious citation to precedent, in certain
circumstances, parties have actively advocated for the application of Title VII to Title VIII. See, e.g.,
People of State of N.Y. by Abrams v. Merlino, 694 F. Supp. 1101, 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (plaintiffs
invoked the relationship between Titles VII and VIII to advocate for a finding that sexual harassment
can be cognizable without the loss of a tangible housing benefit); United States v. Peterson, No. 09-
10333, 2010 WL 2992367, at *6 (E.D. Mich. July 27, 2010) ("The Government urges the Court to
extend the reasoning of Waffle House beyond the Title VII context to the Fair Housing Act claims at
issue here, inasmuch as the statutes are structurally similar and the Attorney General should not be
precluded from bringing a lawsuit on behalf of the victims of unlawful discrimination.").
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case law as precedent for Title VIII analysis generally arises from "the fact the
'two statutes are part of a coordinated scheme of federal civil rights laws
enacted to end discrimination.' 129 In part because of the limited jurisprudence
on sexual harassment under the Fair Housing Act and analogous state fair
housing and civil rights laws, the law on employment discrimination provides
the framework for assessment of sexual harassment as housing discrimination.
C. The Case Law and Critiques and Limits of that Law
This Section of the Article makes the connection between the current state
of the law, the scholars' critique of the law, and the development and adoption
of the "dirty old man" narrative by both scholars and courts. The current
scholarship falls into two primary categories: (1) critique of the Shellhammer
approach of applying Title VII sexual harassment law to Title VIII, and (2)
suggestions of alternate paths to redress. I focus primarily on the former, which
often is also found in the latter as part of the rationale for seeking an alternate
path of redress. The critique rests primarily on the notion that the experience of
and injury attendant to sexual harassment in the home is different than sexual
harassment in the workplace. Specifically, scholars have focused primarily on
the role of poverty in sexual harassment and the impact of sexual harassment
and abuse in the home, which should be a safe refuge protected by society and
law. This is important work that has raised the profile of residential sexual
harassment and pushed advocates and courts to think critically about the
jurisprudence as it develops. 130 It has shed light on a relatively unknown and
under-acknowledged kind of subjugation of women.131 It has challenged the
courts' unrelenting commitment to Title VII as a guidepost for Title VIII sexual
harassment claims1 32 and encouraged courts to assess housing discrimination
129. Merlino, 694 F. Supp. at 1104 (quoting Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington,
844 F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Starrett City Assoc., 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.
1988), and Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979))).
130. 1 approach the current body of scholarship on residential sexual harassment with admiration
and respect. In my analysis and critique of the current body of literature on residential sexual
harassment, I channel Kathryn Abrams's positive discussion of the import of second wave feminists,
even while recognizing that their work tended toward "singular characterizations of female subjects."
See Abrams, supra note 3, at 2482 ("The claim that 'second wave' feminists embraced a notion of a
unitary, identitarian female subject should not be overstated. The singular conceptualizations of
women's perception or experience that marked early feminist efforts were partly strategic; to highlight
the voices that had been excluded, it was often useful to streamline the message and downplay
complexity or contradiction. Moreover, even when unitary conceptions were not attributable solely to
strategic ends, they often held the seeds of their dissolution. Accounts that hypothesized the social
construction of gender at least implicitly raised the question of why women were not subject to other
constructive influences as well. In addition, the juxtaposition of any two such theories-the difference
and dominance theories, for example-revealed that even one's identity 'as a woman' could be shaped
by multiple images, norms, and influences.").
131. See supra Section I.B.
132. See Adams, supra note 7, at 44-48 (making a case for courts to understand and consider the
different in context between residential and workplace sexual harassment); Forkenbrock Lindemyer,
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under a different or more nuanced standard. 133 Scholars have creatively
imagined novel ways of using the Fair Housing Act as a tool to combat sexual
harassment' 34 and proposed alternate claims to seek redress,' 35 and they have
been successful in pushing courts to account for the vulnerable victim and
sexual harassment as invasion of the sanctity of the victim's home.
By focusing on differentiating residential sexual harassment from
workplace sexual harassment, however, the current scholarship in this specific
space does little to challenge the prevailing notion of anti-discrimination law as
a tool to deal with individual bad actors, rather than systemic and institutional
bias. 136 The focus on the financial disparity between perpetrator and victim and
invasion of the sanctity of the victim's home is rooted in individual bad acts
that constitute aberrant behavior. It is the "dirty old man" narrative.
1. The Sanctity of the Home: Scholars'Perspective
One of the primary concerns levied against the application of Title VII
jurisprudence to residential sexual harassment claims is that such application
fails to account for the trauma attendant to sexual abuse in the home, which is
supra note 29, at 352 (defining her thesis as an assessment of how "the current doctrinal analysis of
residential sexual harassment, imported from employment sexual harassment, fails to address core issues
particular to the context of the home.").
133. See Balos, supra note 29, at 90-95 (challenging courts' approach to a landlord's right to
privacy in his home and business to the exclusion of a female tenant's right to privacy in her home);
Zalesne, supra note 29 (proposing a two-step analysis under the Fair Housing Act that assesses the
conduct of the perpetrator, rather than the effect on the victim, alongside the relationship between the
perpetrator and victim).
134. See Schwemm & Oliveri, supra note 29 (proposing an increased use of the Fair Housing Act's
Section 3604(c) to combat sexual harassment in housing).
135. See Keeley, supra note 112 (proposing an implied warranty of freedom from sexual
harassment as a new kind of claim); Short, supra note 23 (proposing claims based on the Thirteenth
Amendment as a challenge to residential sexual harassment).
136. Such is particularly the case in claims asserting disparate treatment, which is generally the
cause of action under which a charge of residential sexual harassment arises. See Honce v. Vigil, I F.3d
1085, 1088-89 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing St. Mary's v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993), and Sorensen v. City
of Aurora, 984 F.2d 349, 352 (10th Cir.1993)); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and
the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (arguing that "structural
employment inequalities cannot be solved without going beyond the generally accepted normative
underpinnings of antidiscrimination law"); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics:
Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 91, I11
(2003) ("Examining the various theories and their underlying conceptions of discrimination, however, it
becomes clear that existing Title VII doctrine, although it recognizes the importance of structural factors
in some contexts, is ill-equipped to address the forms of discrimination that derive from organizational
structure and institutional practice in the modem workplace."). Green further finds that, post-Walmart,
even class action claims of discrimination are unlikely to succeed in challenging the structural forces
that perpetuate discrimination. Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 395, 405 (2011) ("Requiring a policy of discrimination focuses inquiry on
the state of mind of high-level decision makers (the policy makers) of a defendant organization. It is not
enough according to this view that discrimination proliferates within the organization, even if fueled by
organizational structures, institutional practices, and work cultures implemented and controlled by the
employer. The fact finder must find that the entity employer adopted a policy of discrimination."); see
also sources cited supra note 3.
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different than the injury attendant to sexual harassment in the workplace. More
specifically, scholars and litigators have consistently argued that residential
sexual harassment infringes on the sanctity of the home. Regina Cahan first
made that claim in 1987, arguing:
Although the research on the effects of sexual harassment in the work-
place and academia is relevant, the implications of being harassed in
one's home may be even more traumatic. When sexual harassment
occurs at work, at that moment or at the end of the workday, the
woman may remove herself from the offensive environment. She will
choose whether to resign from her position based on economic and
personal considerations. In contrast, when the harassment occurs in a
woman's home, it is a complete invasion in her life. Ideally, home is
the haven from the troubles of the day. When home is not a safe place,
a woman may feel distressed and, often, immobile.'
37
Since 1987, several scholars have agreed with and expanded on Cahan's
insight, looking at the issue of sexual harassment in the home from different
angles. Michelle Adams, for example, argues that courts fail to account for the
unique context of residential sexual harassment. 38 Citing case law in other
areas recognizing and promoting the sanctity of the home, she notes: "[A]s an
ideal, the home is the repository of all that has happened in one's life that is
'good' or supposed to be good; it is the place where we imagine a life that is
better than it ever was."' 39 Nicole Forkenbrock Lindemyer agrees, arguing that
"the current practice of transporting Title VII standards used in analyzing
employment sexual harassment into Title VIII cases of residential sexual
harassment fails to appreciate the fundamental conceptual and circumstantial
distinctions between the two contexts.' 140 Deborah Zalesne finds sexual
harassment in housing particularly troubling because of its invasion into the
sanctity of the home. 141
Not all scholars believe that there is a history of universally recognizing the
sanctity of a person's home. While Beverly Balos agrees that courts have
recognized the sanctity of the home as a rationale for privacy protections, she
argues that the national jurisprudence limits that protection to select groups.
She contrasts the invocation of privacy protections for male domestic violence
137. Cahan, supra note 22, at 1073.
138. Adams, supra note 7, at 17; see also Carlotta J. Ross, DiCenso v. Cisneros: An Argument for
Recognizing the Sanctity of the Home in Housing Sexual Harassment Cases, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1131,
1137 (1998) (using DiCenso as an springboard to discuss how Title Vil's misapplication to Title ViII
ignores ingrained principles of the home as a sacred space).
139. Adams, supra note 7, at 25.
140. Forkenbrock Lindemyer, supra note 29, at 353.
141. Zalesne, supra note 29, at 862.
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perpetrators with the failure to recognize the privacy interest of female tenants
who are targets of sexual harassment by their landlords.
42
2. The Sanctity of the Home: Courts 'Perspective
Although courts have not gone as far as scholars and advocates would like
in recognizing how residential sexual harassment invades the sanctity of the
woman's home, the concept has gained some traction in case law. Of the more
than one hundred court opinions on residential sexual harassment, twelve
courts explicitly highlighted or discussed the fact that the harassing conduct
occurred in the woman's home, a place where she should feel safe and
secure. 143 That count does not include factual assertions that would indicate the
invasion of the sanctity of a woman's home (i.e. illegal use of passkey or
plaintiffs fear of defendant at home) without further discussion by the court.
Cahan's argument has been cited favorably by three federal district courts,1
4 4
HUD,145 and at least two state and federal trial and appellate briefs. The
court in Beliveau v. Caras, for example, noted:
Particularly where, as here, the alleged battery was committed (1) in
plaintiffs own home, where she should feel (and be) less vulnerable,
and (2) by one whose very role was to provide that safe environment,
defendants' contention that plaintiff has failed to allege "conduct that
was so severe or pervasive to 'alter the conditions' of plaintiffs
housing environment" and has failed to "allege an 'abusive' housing
environment" resulting from defendants' conduct is not well-taken. 1
47
The lower court in Quigley v. Winter also drew an explicit distinction
between sexual harassment at work and at home, finding that "[a] tenant should
be able to feel secure in her own home, and there was testimony from Ms.
Quigley that she was not," 148 a sentiment adopted by the Eighth Circuit on
142. Balos, supra note 29, at 79-80. But see Keeley, supra note 112, at 417-19 (suggesting that an
emphasis on the context of the home could backfire as a litigation strategy and arguing that "courts
should first focus on the nature of the relationship between the parties and why it exists rather than the
setting in which the harassment occurs").
143. See infra Appendix A, "Sanctity of Home."
144. Salisbury v. Hickman, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1292 (E.D. Cal. 2013); Richards v. Bono, No.
5:04CV484-OC-lOGRJ, 2005 WL 1065141, at *5 n.34 (M.D. Fla. May 2,2005); Beliveau v. Caras, 873
F. Supp. 1393, 1397 n.I (C.D. Cal. 1995).
145. Fair Housing Act Regulations Amendments Standards Governing Sexual Harassment Cases,
65 Fed. Reg. 67666-01 (Nov. 13, 2000) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
146. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 26 n.4, Akron Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm.,
No. 07-0254, 2007 WL 3090515 (Ohio Oct. 3, 2007); Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum at 11,
Brown v. Univ. Mgmt. Inc., No. 05-71896, 2007 WL 4590006 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 20,2007).
147. Beliveau, 873 F. Supp. at 1398; see also id. at 1397 n.l (citing Cahan for the proposition that
"sexual harassment in the home is in some respects more oppressive" than sexual harassment in the
workplace).
148. Quigley v. Winter, 584 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1157 (N.D. Iowa 2008).
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appeal. 149 In United States v. Veal, the court found that the defendant's entry
into the aggrieved women's homes "had the effect of destroying any sense of
security the women had in their homes,"' 150 and the court in United States v.
Peterson lamented the defendant's "egregious" behavior, which interfered
"with the women's peaceful enjoyment of their homes, which should have been
the one place where they could turn for refuge.
' ' 51
3. The Vulnerable Victim: Scholars'Perspective
Set inside and alongside the sanctity of the home narrative is the vulnerable
victim narrative. The vulnerable victim narrative sets up the economic power
differential between the deviant male landlord and the vulnerable female
tenant.152 Like the narrative in the Hurt case described at the beginning of this
Article, vulnerability attendant to poverty rises to the surface of the stock story.
Unsurprisingly, allegations in sexual harassment cases and the existing data
bear out the hypothesis that poverty is a key factor for residential sexual
harassment. 53 The singular focus on economic vulnerability, however, further
cements the concept that sexual harassment has a universal nature and universal
impact unrelated to the race of the victim or the perpetrator.
Scholars who have specifically written about sexual harassment in rental
housing have nearly all found that poverty is a critical factor in assessing a
female tenant's susceptibility to sexual harassment. Michelle Adams argues
that, while there are multiple vulnerabilities that may operate to increase a
woman's susceptibility to residential sexual harassment, "the final gloss on all
of these factors is the relationship between gender and poverty."' 154 Beverly
Balos contends that "[b]eing a low-income tenant or experiencing poverty is a
key factor in being vulnerable to sexual harassment in housing .... Looking at
149. Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 947 (8th Cir. 2010) ("We emphasize that Winter subjected
Quigley to these unwanted interactions in her own home, a place where Quigley was entitled to feel safe
and secure and need not flee, which makes Winter's conduct even more egregious."); see also Williams
v. Poretsy Management, 955 F. Supp. 490, 498 (D. Md. 1996) (citing Beliveau for the proposition that
"[a]t least one court has recognized that sexual harassment in the home may have more severe effects
than harassment in the workplace"); Salisbury v. Hickman, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1292 (E.D. Cal. 2013)
(same); Richards v. Bono, No. 5:04CV484-OC-IOGRJ, 2005 WL 1065141, at *5 n.34 (M.D. Fla. May
5, 2005) (same); Reeves v. Carrollsburg Condominium Unit Owners Ass'n, No. CIV. A. 96-2495RMU,
1997 WL 1877201, at *6 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1997) (same); People ex rel. City of Santa Monica v. Gabriel,
186 Cal. App. 4th 882, 888 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Cahan, supra note 22for the proposition that
harassment in the home is more severe than harassment at work in the context of a sexual harassment
claim under state unfair business practice law).
150. United States v. Veal, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1038 (W.D. Mo. 2004).
151. United States v. Peterson, No. 09-10333, 2011 WL 824602, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 3,2011).
152. See Zalesne, supra note 29, at 866 ("Sexual harassment occurs when one person is in a
position of power with respect to the other.").
153. See United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 983 (D. Nev. 2004) (one sexual harassment
victim testified that, "as a result of her eviction, she had no permanent home for three months, living
'everywhere' and 'anywhere'); Woods v. Foster, 884 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (plaintiff forced to
choose a period of homelessness over sexual coercion in homeless shelter).
154. Adams, supra note 7, at 37.
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the descriptions of the plaintiffs in the reported federal cases reveals that they
are poor women, often providing the only support for their families and often
facing homelessness."'' 55 Aric Short agrees, noting that "[v]ictims of sexual
harassment are not selected at random. ' 56 Short points to poverty, isolation
and desperation as the critical factors for susceptibility to residential sexual
harassment and, based on the victims' fear of consequences resulting from non-
compliance with sexual demands, makes a distinction between sexual
harassment and "other forms of residential harassment, including racial,
disability, or national origin harassment."
' 157
Statistics and case law establish that poverty is, indeed, a primary risk
factor for experiencing sexual harassment in rental housing. In Regina Cahan's
survey, she found that, of those reports identifying specific characteristics,
"seventy-five percent of the women possessed annual incomes under $10,000,
twenty-three percent between $10,000-$20,000 and the remaining two percent
between $20,000-$30,000." '  Robert Schwemm and Rigel Oliveri update her
assessment by cataloguing cases and scholarship further recognizing the link
between poverty and sexual harassment in rental housing.
159
Scholars have largely acknowledged the relationship between poverty and
race. In other words, there is explicit (and important) recognition that women of
color, particularly Black women, are disproportionately poor and therefore,
disproportionately subject to sexual harassment in housing. Citing statistical
evidence of the relationship between race and poverty, Deborah Zalesne finds
that "[t]he typical victim of landlord sexual harassment ... is a poor, minority,
and often powerless woman." 160 Michelle Adams notes the additional burden
that race discrimination may play in further exaggerating the gap in bargaining
power between landlord and tenant:
The inequality of bargaining power between female tenants and male
landlords is exacerbated by aspects of those renters' lives that further
diminish their chances of competing effectively for the relatively few
affordable housing units that are available. These factors reduce
bargaining power and increase the pressure on women to accede to a
landlord's sexual demand or to remain in a hostile housing
155. Balos, supra note 29, at 97.
156. Short, supra note 23, at 841.
157. Id.
158. Cahan, supra note 22, at 1067 (looking at residential sexual harassment complaints primarily
between 1980 and 1985).
159. See Schwemm & Oliveri, supra note 29, at 786-87 n.92.
160. See Zalesne, supra note 29, at 864; see also Forkenbrock Lindemyer, supra note 29, at 371-75
(citing Zalesne and arguing that "[i]t is therefore impossible to ignore the composition of those primarily
affected by sexual harassment in housing: women of color struggling to raise their children in situations
of dire poverty"); Keeley, supra note 112, at 416 (arguing that Title Vll's jurisprudence is a poor fit for
analyzing claims under Title VIII because "a disproportionate number of renters affected by sexual
harassment are poor women of color").
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environment. One of those factors is race. Although it is difficult to
determine with absolute certainty the racial background of the
plaintiffs in the relevant cases, several salient facts about them are
known: they are women; many of these women are the sole financial
support for their families; they are renters; and at least some of them
are homeless or facing homelessness.'
6 1
In recognizing that women of color are disproportionately poor, renters,
and single heads of household, Adams draws the conclusion that women of
color are disproportionately susceptible to sexual harassment in housing. She
also recognizes that the mere fact of race and racism impedes a woman of
color's bargaining power in competing for the limited number of affordable
housing units in the country. Both assessments, while helpful in identifying the
problem of residential sexual harassment, subsume the Black woman's (or
other woman of color's) experience into the generic problem of sexual
harassment in rental housing. 
162
4. The Vulnerable Victim: Courts'Perspective
A review of the case law uncovers twelve opinions that explicitly
acknowledge the economic vulnerability of particular women experiencing
sexual harassment in the home. 16 3 That count does not include opinions where
the facts (i.e. plaintiff received government benefits or subsidized housing) set
forth would lead a reasonable reader to conclude that the plaintiff or plaintiffs
are financially vulnerable. Unlike the scholarship in the area, however, the
opinions focus on specific instances of sexual harassment and specific women
experiencing both poverty and sexual harassment in housing. Where the
scholarship acknowledges the institutional power differential for women in
poverty, a disproportionate number of whom are Black or otherwise women of
color, the judicial narrative generally limits itself to assessment of the single (or
multiple) plaintiffs.
The court opinion that comes closest to recognizing the structural impact of
poverty on a woman's vulnerability to residential sexual harassment resides in
a dissent. In Honce v. Vigil, Judge Seymour chastised the majority by calling
attention to the plaintiff s dire financial circumstances:
The majority seemingly believes that a single mother of a young child
who has just borrowed money to buy a mobile home and has signed a
161. Adams, supra note 7, at 35.
162. But cf Zalesne, supra note 29, at 864 (challenging a single standard for a reasonable women
standard, citing the difference types of subordination experienced by poor women and wealthy women
and women of different races).
163. See infra Appendix A, "Vulnerability of Victim."
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rental agreement for the lot onto which she has moved it somehow is
completely free to abandon the lease and leave the premises upon
finding the conduct of her new landlord offensive. This inference,
adversely drawn by the majority against Ms. Honce, is belied by Mr.
Vigil's insistent testimony that Ms. Honce was in severe financial
straits, and by the fact that she ultimately was required to borrow
$1,000 from her parents to pay the cost of moving the cost of moving
the mobile home. It also defies common sense regarding the economic
realities of single working mothers such as Ms. Honce."
The rest of the examples limit their assessment to the particularized facts of
the plaintiffs circumstances and her experience with discrimination. The
Eighth Circuit majority in Quigley, for example, acknowledged the plaintiff's
lack of financial resources, which, according to the court, gave significant
power to the landlord:
Winter's conduct was reprehensible. Quigley lived alone with small
children at the time of Winter's harassment, and she had few, if any,
alternate housing options. Quigley's financial vulnerability was
evidenced by her need for Section 8 housing vouchers. Winter held a
certain level of power over Quigley and her family. 165
Several other courts referenced the plaintiffs reliance on government
subsidies or the risk of homelessness to indirectly acknowledge the relationship
between the plaintiffs financial circumstances and her experience with sexual
harassment in housing.' 66 In United States v. Veal, the court found the
defendants' conduct to be "reprehensible" in part because "[e]ach of the
victims was financially vulnerable-all of the women were receiving Section 8
public housing assistance at the time of the harassment, and several had been
homeless prior to renting from the Veals.",t 6 7 The court in Boswell v.
Gumbaytay cited to an audio recording of Mr. Gumbaytay making sexual
propositions to the plaintiff, saying, "[S]ometimes a woman has to do what a
164. Honce v. Vigil, I F.3d 1085, 1094 (10th Cir. 1993) (Seymour, J., dissenting).
165. Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 954 (8th Cir. 2010); see also Cennamo v. Deem, No. 02 CA
22, 2002 WL 31873792, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2002) (reporting plaintiff's testimony that she did
not report the incidents of sexual harassment "because she was in a custody battle and feared the
ramifications of losing stable housing" and her housing subsidies).
166. See United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 983 (D. Neb. 2004) (referencing one
witness's testimony that she had no permanent home for three months after being evicted by defendant);
Woods v. Foster, 884 F. Supp. 1169, 1172 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (noting that plaintiff experienced a period of
homelessness after leaving the shelter where she would have been forced to accede to plaintiffs sexual
demands); Grieger v. Sheets, No. 87 C 6567, 1989 WL 38707, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 1989) (noting
that defendant threatened to make plaintiff lose her Section 8 certificate if she rejected his sexual
advances).
167. United States v. Veal, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1038 (W.D. Mo. 2004); see also United States v.
Peterson, No. 09-10333, 2011 WL 824602, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 3, 2011) (noting that the record
reflected that the defendant had "eagerly and repeatedly exploited their plight").
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woman has to do in order to feed her family and live a comfortable lifestyle for
her and her family." 168 The clear implication is that Mr. Gumbaytay recognized
that the plaintiff's financial status gave him the power to abuse his authority.
The courts' willingness to consider the relationship between poverty and
sex discrimination (in the form of residential sexual harassment) is
encouraging. The courts' unwillingness to assess that poverty in terms of
institutional poverty and/or racial poverty is discouraging. It stands as a symbol
for the critique of anti-discrimination law as a means of addressing structural
and complex discrimination. 69
1V. WHY THE "DIRTY OLD MAN NARRATIVE" IS PROBLEMATIC
There are legitimate reasons to choose to pursue the "dirty old man"
narrative. Like any stock story, the "dirty old man" narrative is prevalent in part
because it is successful. The Attorney General settled Gumbaytay, Mitchell,
Pontotoc, and Sorenson. The Mitchell case, for example, ended with an
agreement from the defendants to pay one million dollars in monetary damages
to aggrieved persons and to the government as a civil penalty1 70 and the related
cases of Hawecker v. Sorensen and United States v. Sorensen resulted in a
$2.13 million settlement. 17 Further, an alternate story is difficult to tell. Not
only does it face legal hurdles due to the civil rights laws' focus on individual
conduct, but there are legitimate strategies for choosing the "dirty old man"
narrative. From a litigation strategy perspective, the standard narrative explains
why women subject to residential sexual harassment in housing do not extricate
themselves from the situation.172 Second, it takes the sting out of the female
tenants' personal history-for example, poverty, joblessness, addiction,
prostitution, criminal charges-because it makes their vulnerability to
victimization part of a stock story. Third, it acts as a common narrative thread
in a class action or a case alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination. As
explained by Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner, each party must develop
a "rhetorical strategy" that categorizes both the aggrieved women and the
168. Boswell v. Gumbaytay, No. 2:07-CV-135-WKW, 2009 WL 1515872, at *5 n.4 (M.D. Ala.
June 1, 2009); see also Boswell, 2009 WL 1515912, at *9 (M.D. Ala. June 1, 2009) (citing to the
plaintiff's deposition, where she stated that she was "constantly afraid that [her] family would not have a
place to live if [she] did not meet his demands"); cf Gromko v. Berezin, No. 105640/07, 2008 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 8791 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 17, 2008) (plaintiff alleged that defendant rented apartments
disproportionately to young, single women upon whom he could prey).
169. See sources cited supra note 3.
170. $1 Million Judgment in Sexual Harassment Case Against Cincinnati Landlord, U.S. DEP'T
JUSTICE (Sept. 4, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/September/08-crt-776.html.
171. California Landlord Settles Sexual Harassment Lawsuit for $2.13 Million, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE
(Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/califormia-landiord-settles-sexual-harassment-lawsuit-
213-million.
172. See Reed, et al., supra note 19.
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defendant in an effort to persuade a jury faced with competing rhetoric and
categorization advanced by the defendant's attorney.1
73
Exclusively advancing the "dirty old man" narrative, especially in the face
of evidence of racialized sexual harassment, however, remains problematic.
The most obvious problem, of course, is that it omits race from the discourse.
Such an omission is of significant concern because it silences a subset of
victims of residential sexual harassment, perpetuating the cultural myth of the
Black Jezebel. Further, it ignores the other structural forces inherent in
residential sexual harassment that have operated, together with the myth of the
Black Jezebel, to perpetuate the sexual subjugation of Black women in the
private sphere.
A. The Exclusion of Race
Whereas courts have been somewhat explicit in acknowledging the dual
elements of the "dirty old man" narrative-invasion of the sanctity of the home
and the tenant's economic vulnerability-the impact of race is generally
ignored. Of the more than one hundred court opinions, only nine mention race
at all. 174 For all but two opinions, race drops out of the analysis before the court
gets to the substantive analysis.1
75
In certain judicial opinions, race drops out of the analysis after laying out
the facts without explanation. In People of the State of New York by Abrams v.
Merlino, for example, the court recognized, in the introduction of the opinion,
that the two plaintiffs were Black; thereafter, race was absent from the
opinion.17 6 In Fahnbulleh v. GFZ Realty, LLC, the court acknowledged that the
case alleged discrimination on the basis of both race and sex, but limited its
analysis to hostile housing environment on the basis of sex.'77 In Krueger v.
Cuomo, in setting out the facts, the court noted that the female tenant, who is
Black, told the defendant that she did not date White men.' 78 That
acknowledgement was the sum total of the court's recognition of the impact of
race in the case.
173. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW: How COURTS RELY ON
STORYTELLING, AND How THEIR STORIES CHANGE THE WAYS WE UNDERSTAND THE LAW-AND
OURSELVES 48 (2000).
174. See infra Appendix A, "Mention of Race."
175. See Reeves v. Carrollsburg Condominium Unit Owners Ass'n, No. CIV. A. 96-2495RMU,
1997 WL 1877201 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1997); Brown v. Smith, 55 Cal. App. 4th 767 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
176. People of the State of N.Y. by Abrams v. Merlino, 694 F. Supp. 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); cf.
Braun v. Bolton, No. 13-1093-RGA, 2013 WL 5486877 (D. Del. Sept. 30, 2013) (although the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant treated her like a "slave," there was no mention of race in the opinion);
Walker v. Crawford, No. 5:97-CV-1033, 1999 WL 33917846 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 16, 1999) (noting that
plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew their claims of discrimination on the basis of race).
177. Fahnbulleh v. GFZ Realty, LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 360 (D. Md. 2011).
178. Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487,490 (7th Cir. 1997).
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In other judicial opinions, courts explicitly silo the race discrimination and
sex discrimination allegations to the detriment of the overall complaint.
Harmon v. Mattson typifies the impact of that approach.' 79 In Harmon, the
plaintiff brought suit against the defendant under state law, alleging
discrimination in housing on the basis of race, gender, disability, and receipt of
public assistance. 180 Ms. Harmon alleged that her landlord, Mr. Mattson,
peeped through her windows, rubbed up against her, entered her apartment late
at night to do repairs, and stayed on the premises ten to twelve hours per day.'
8
'
She also recalled that Mr. Mattson called her a "bitch," "goofy," "crazy,"
"idiot," and a "nigger" and chased her daughters, calling them "niggers."'
' 82
Although the advisory jury found for Ms. Harmon on all claims, awarding her
and her children compensatory damages, out-of-pocket costs, and punitive
damages, the appellate court reversed on all claims except the race
discrimination claim, fimding that Ms. Harmon provided insufficient evidence
to rise to the level of a hostile housing environment based on sex or sexual
harassment and that evidence of intentional infliction of emotional distress
failed to rise to necessary severe and pervasive level.183 The court's analysis
ignores the possibility that Ms. Harmon's experience of sexual harassment was
sufficiently severe and pervasive in light of its relationship with the race
discrimination. The court disregarded the possible impact of race on Ms.
Harmon's sex discrimination claim. This Article suggests, throughout, that the
omission of race from the assessment of sex discrimination is troubling.
Harmon stands as an example of a case in which an analysis of sex
discrimination accounting for race may have led to a different result. It is a
symbol of the practical results of excising race from analysis of sex
discrimination.
The opinion in Brown v. Smith is similarly troubling. Mr. and Mrs. Brown
brought suit against their landlord, Mr. Smith, alleging that the defendant
sexually harassed Mrs. Brown in violation of state anti-discrimination and civil
rights laws. After a jury awarded the tenant more than $200,000 in damages
and attorney's fees,' 84 the defendant appealed and, citing evidentiary errors, the
appellate court reversed. The reported facts included allegations of racialized
sexual harassment. Mrs. Brown testified that "[the defendant would] say that he
loved Black women and he had lots of Black women-and that he, he wanted
179. See also Essex Ins. Co. v. Harris, No. 4:09CV2071 TIA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113421 (E.D.
Mo. Sept. 30, 2011) (insurance case where the underlying matter involved two current plaintiffs and two
prospective tenants alleging race discrimination and sex discrimination in the form of sexual
harassment; brief discussion of the race of the parties was limited to the race claims).
180. Harmon v. Mattson, No. CO-99-755, 1999 WL 1057236 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1999). The
complaint also alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
181. Id. at *2.
182. Id.
183. Id. at *4, *6-7.
184. Brown v. Smith, 55 Cal. App. 4th 767, 767, 774 (Ct. App. 1997).
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to have an affair with me and he wanted to have sex with me. He wanted to lick
my pussy and suck my titties, and all those despicable things."' 85 Further,
plaintiffs introduced evidence from four other witnesses-all Black female
tenants-who testified to similar sexual harassment.' 86 The appellate court's
analysis with respect to Mrs. Brown's allegations, however, excluded race,1 87
with one exception. In discussing the propriety of permitting the other tenants
to testify, the appellate court speculated:
Brown has alleged intentional sexual harassment in connection with
her housing, and the evidence was offered toward proving that theory.
However, it is possible to find within this evidence a more innocuous
pattern of Smith's sexual attraction to Black females between the ages
of 20 and 40. Such attraction does not necessarily amount to sexual
harassment absent additional elements of coercion, unsolicited sexual
attention, abuse of his status as landlord, and the like. Findings on this
issue would have been helpful.... 18 8
Rather than assuming that the defendant had engaged in racialized sexual
harassment, the court excused the defendant's racist statements and discounted
their impact on the plaintiff's sexual harassment claim.
Out of the one hundred and two court opinions, only one explicitly
acknowledged the relationship between racism and sexism in residential sexual
harassment. In Reeves v. Carrollsburg Condominium Unit Owners Association,
the plaintiff alleged violation of the Fair Housing Act (in addition to other
claims) on the basis of both race and sex.' 89 Specifically, the suit alleged that
one of the White residents of the condominium building racially and sexually
harassed the plaintiff, a Black woman. 190 The Reeves court refrained from
creating silos around the race discrimination and sex discrimination
allegations.191 It noted that defendant "repeatedly subjected Ms. Reeves to
threats of rape and lynching, in addition to the racial and sexual character of his
185. Id. at 774-75.
186. ld. at 788.
187. Id. at 792-94 (summarizing Mrs. Brown's allegations of sexual harassment and eliminating
any discussion of race or racialized sexual harassment).
188. Id. at 794-95.
189. Reeves v. Carrollsburg Condominium Unit Owners Ass'n, No. CIV. A. 96-2495, 1997 WL
1877201, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1997). Although pleading is the most obvious stage to begin thinking
about reframing the narrative of sexual harassment in housing, there is evidence that there is risk to
ultimate success on the merits if one pleads multiple claims, see, e.g., Emma Reece Denny, Mo' Claims
Mo' Problems: How Courts Ignore Multiple Claimants in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 30
LAW & INEQ. 339, 350 (2012), Reeves provides an example of how a complaint can assert both race
discrimination and sex discrimination in a way that gains traction with the court.
190. Reeves, 1997 WL 1877201, at *1.
191. Compare Reeves, 1997 WL 1877201, with Smith v. Mission Assocs. Ltd., 225 F. Supp. 2d
1293, 1299 (D. Kan. 2002) (acknowledging allegations of disparaging remarks about race and sexual
orientation, but dismissing the sexual harassment case for lack of evidence and reframing the claim as
one for hostile housing environment based on race discrimination).
[Vol. 27:227
Structural Subjugation
verbal abuse and his admitted racism. There is no question that such conduct
was unwelcome and was based on sex and/or race ..... 192 The allegations in
Reeves, however, present an atypical fact pattern for residential sexual
harassment. According to a contemporaneous news story, Ms. Reeves was an
attorney in Washington, D.C. at the time of the harassment.' 93 Further, the
perpetrator was Ms. Reeves' neighbor, not her landlord. 194 Although Reeves
offers a glimmer of hope for intersectionality claims of sexual harassment, one
must wonder whether courts are receptive to creative theories only when stock
stories are unavailable. Reviewing the analysis of court opinions on residential
sexual harassment, it is striking that the courts are simultaneously committed to
the particularities of any one woman's story of sexual harassment and yet
unwilling to recognize that any one woman's story is outside of the stock
story, 195 especially when it comes to the intersection of sex and race.'
96
Seemingly in tension with one another, those dual commitments operate to
ignore structural and institutional racism as it relates to sexual harassment in
housing.
Why does the exclusion of race in this context matter? It matters because
engaging the "dirty old man" narrative adopts gender essentialism; it assumes
that all women experience residential sexual harassment in the same way. As
Angela Harris explains, however, gender essentialism silences certain voices to
privilege others. 97 The evidence set forth above, especially when viewed in
light of the historical structural forces perpetuating the sexual subjugation of
Black women throughout American history, is a clear example of how the
standard narrative, which has found success in residential sexual harassment
cases for certain women, silences those Black women experiencing racialized
sexual harassment. It matters because, as Kimberle Crenshaw and Dorothy
Roberts have explained, the intersection of race and gender is impossible to
separate and trying to do so disadvantages Black women.
98
192. Reeves, 1997 WL 1877201, at *7.
193. Bill Miller, D.C. Condo Owners to Pay for Member's Racial insults, WASH. POST (June 10,
1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/06/10/dc-condo-owners-to-pay-for-
members-racial-insults/198el 599-166b-4ba7-847f-33e32df43076.
194. Id. It is worth noting that the condominium association originally voted to permit Ms. Reeves
to sell her unit but failed to proceed to settlement for more than two years. Reeves, 1997 WL 1877201, at
*1.
195. Cf Adams, supra note 7, at 52 (highlighting courts' unwillingness to "import [ ] a
contextualized understanding [of a woman's experience of sexual harassment at home] into their
determinations").
196. Mayeri, supra note 3, at 714 n.6 (highlighting courts' unwillingness to address complex
discrimination or intersectionality in Title VII claims).
197. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581,
585 (1990).
198. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Racist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
139, 152-60; Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1424 (1991).
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It is more than the dignitary benefit of allowing a woman to tell her
individual story in court. Regina Austin, in calling to minority female scholars
to "testify" on their own behalf, explains why testimony, complete as she notes
"with footnotes," matters:
We must write with an empowered and empowering voice. The chief
sources of our theory should be black women's critiques of a society
that is dominated by and structured to favor white men of wealth and
power. We should also find inspiration in the modes of resistance
black women mount, individually and collectively, on a daily basis in
response to discrimination and exploitation. Our jurisprudence should
amplify the criticism and lend clarity and visibility to the positive
transformative cultural parries that are overlooked unless close
attention is given to the actual struggles of black women. In addition,
our jurisprudence should create enough static to interfere with the
transmission of the dominant ideology and jam the messages that
reduce our indignation, limit our activism, misdirect our energies, and
otherwise make us the (re)producers of our own subordination. By way
of an alternative, a black feminist jurisprudence should preach the
justness of the direct, participatory, grass-roots opposition black
women undertake despite enormous material and structural
constraints.
199
Austin's call, albeit to an arguably different audience than that to which this
Article speaks, gives voice to the normative value of eschewing a legal strategy
that adopts a standard narrative that ignores the experience of racialized sexual
harassment.
Beyond the significant concerns of erasing racialized sexual harassment in
favor of a standard narrative drawn from a White woman's experience, further
developing and cementing a jurisprudence of residential sexual harassment
devoid of an understanding of the relationship between race and sexual
harassment will make it harder for the next plaintiff seeking to raise an
intersectional claim. 200 Exclusive adoption of the "dirty old man" narrative,
which leaves out evidence of harm associated with the racial animus embedded
in the residential sexual harassment, limits the potential recovery for women
experiencing racialized sexual harassment. And it ignores the structural forces
perpetuating the acceptance of the sexual subjugation of women, particularly
Black women.
199. Austin, supra note 95, 542-44.
200. See Abrams, supra note 3; Mayeri, supra note 3, at 714 n.6.
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B. The Focus on Invasion of the Sanctity of the Home Ignores the Role of
Legal Rights in the Structure of Subjugation
Legal authority, grounded in property law, provides the structure allowing
harassment and coercion in the rental transactions. In property law, a property
owner holds certain rights, depending on the means by which he holds title to
201the property. Fee simple ownership, for example, affords a property owner
certain rights, including the right to retain possession of his property
permanently and the right to transfer ownership rights to any party at any
202time. At the most basic level, landlords and property owners legally retain
203certain rights to enter their property. A property owner or his agent must be
able to enter his property to fix a broken pipe or stop a fire.204 Thus, the
landlord's property rights limit the renter's privacy rights in her home. One of
the most prevalent allegations in residential sexual harassment cases is the use
of the landlord's (or his agent's) passkey to enter a tenant's home uninvited.20 5
Renters also hold certain property rights, generally designated in the lease and
derived from state or local law. Oftentimes, the renter's rights are relative to the
owner's rights.20 6 For example, the renter has the right to live in a house that is
maintained in habitable condition. 20 7 For practical purposes, that means, for
example, that the owner is obligated to fix leaky pipes or cure rodent
208infestation. Another common sexual harassment allegation is that the
property owner or his agent conditioned maintenance work on the tenant's
submission to sexual demands.
20 9
201. See generally2 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 14.04 (David A. Thomas ed., 2d. ed. 2002)
("Real Property"); B. BARLOW BURKE, PROPERTY: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 108-10 (2004).
202. See 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estates § 13 (2015); Luther Blissett, What Does "Fee Simple Ownership"
Mean?, S.F. GATE, http://homeguides.sfgate.com/fee-simple-ownership-mean-57263.html.
203. 5 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 40.06 (David A. Thomas ed., 2d. ed. 2002) ("Right to
Enter the Leased Property") (setting out the exceptions to the general rule that a landlord does not have a
right to enter leased premises); see also Zalesne, supra note 29, at 866 (citing Robert Rosenthal,
Comment, Landlord Sexual Harassment: A Federal Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 589 (1992)).
204. 5 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 203.
205. See, e.g., Richards v. Bono, No. 5:04CV484-OC-IOGRJ, 2005 WL 1065141, *1 (M.D. Fla.
May 2, 2005); Ramirez v. Wong, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1480 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); Haddad v. Gonzalez,
576 N.E.2d. 658, 660 (Mass. 1991); see also Adams, supra note 7, at 35 (citing Krueger v. Cuomo, 115
F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 1997), as an example of allegations involving use of a passkey)); Forkenbrock
Lindemyer, supra note 29, at 375 ("At any time, the landlord could use his passkey to enter the victim's
apartment and further assault her.").
206. 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 454 (2015).
207. Id.
208. 43 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D § 329 (2015) ("To establish a breach of the implied warranty
of habitability of leased residential premises, the tenant must put forth facts showing the nature and
duration of the defective condition, as well as the seriousness and substantial effect of the condition on
the use of the premises for living purposes. There a number of common types of defects or conditions
that may render the premises unfit for human habitation, including insect and rodent infestation; water
leakage through roofs, ceilings, and walls; faulty plumbing; lead-based paint hazards; renovation and
construction activities undertaken by the landlord; and noise by other tenants." (internal citations
omitted)).
209. Grieger v. Sheets, No. 87 C 6567, 1989 WL 38707, *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 1989).
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For Black women, there is a history of formal and de facto laws operating
to permit or condone sexual subjugation, grounded in privacy, property and
home. During slavery, a number of legal classifications and definitions
operated to grant a slaveholder physical rights over his slaves' bodies,
including sexual access. 210 First, of course, was a female slave's legal status as
the property of her slave owner. Second, the absence of legal protection
against rape or sexual assault of slave women or girls. 212 Coupled with laws
forbidding Black testimony against Whites,2 13 formal law left Black enslaved
women without legal remedy for sexual assault or rape.
Because law gives a "framework for legitimate discourse and action in the
exercise of power,, 2 14 historic legal authority granting men access to Black
women and ignoring resulting sexual assault in the private sphere has seeped
into the consciousness of American society and has been replicated in various
constructs over time. In addition to being found in Black women's experiences
under slavery, it existed in the sexual assault of Black domestic workers after
emancipation. 2 15 Melissa Harris-Perry explains:
For decades following the end of Southern slavery, more than three-
fourths of African American women worked primarily as domestic
workers. Their labor put them in proximity and subordinate status to
white men, many of whom held deeply ingrained sexual beliefs about
black women. Further, their race and gender denied them full
protection of the law. These realities meant that black women were
particularly vulnerable to sexual assault.
216
Like the enslaved Black women before them, domestic workers were
explicitly excluded from legal protections designed to prevent or remedy
exploitation and abuse. Both the Fair Labor Standards Act, passed in 1938, and
210. "Historians estimate that at least 58 percent of all enslaved women between the ages of 15 and
30 had been sexually assaulted by White men." See Carolyn M. West, Sexual Violence in the Lives of
African American Women: Risk, Response, and Resilience, National Online Resource Center on
Violence Against Women, NAT'L ONLINE RESOURCE CTR. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1 (Oct.
2006), http://www.vawnet.org/AssocFilesVAWnet/ARSVAAWomen.pdf (citing Darlene Clark
Hine, Rape and the Inner Lives of Black Women in the Middle West, 14 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE &
SOC'Y 912, 920 (1989)). But see Diane Miller Sommerville, Rape, in BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA,
supra note 100, at 22 (noting that historians "have long debated the pervasiveness of sexual relations
between masters and slaves, with some claiming the practice was widespread and systematic, or at the
very least routine")
211. Miller Sommerville, supra note 210, at 21.
212. Id.
213. Id.; Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape as a Badge of Slavery: The Legal History of and Remedies for,
Prosecutorial Race-of- Victim Charging Disparities, 7 NEV. L.J. 1, 6 (2006).
214. Spearlt, Enslaved by Words: Legalities & Limitations of "Post-Racial" Language, 2011
MICH. ST. L. REV. 705, 710.
215. Jane E. Dabel, Domestic Workers, in BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA, supra note 100, at 361-67
(detailing the large percentage of Black women who worked as domestic workers in White homes
between 1800 and the 1970s).
216. HARRIS-PERRY, supra note 95, at 59.
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the National Labor Relations Act, passed in 1935, specifically excluded
agricultural and domestic workers from the list of protected workers.217
Without inclusion in those laws, domestic workers, primarily African American
women, went without important labor rights, including the right to wages, and
lacked the ability to unionize and bargain collectively.
Today, we see the national acceptance of the sexual subjugation of Black
women in the private sphere in in the failure to prosecute perpetrators of rape
against Black women at the same rate as rapes against White women. 218 It is
found in the disproportionate number of Black women imprisoned and denied
downward departures under the criminal sentencing guidelines. 2 19 Looking at
both the history of and current societal approach to sexual assault of Black
women, Jeffrey Pokorak argues that "[t]he influence of slavery and racism on
criminal prosecutions and punishments cannot be overemphasized" and warns
that "the centuries-long history of disparate treatment of Black rape victims
continues today., 220 In other words, the legal authority permitting sexual abuse
of enslaved Black women has infused America's legal and extralegal
framework in a way that perpetuates sexual subjugation of Black women. One
venue in which that plays out is in rental transactions.
217. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§
151-69 (2012)); Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§
201-19 (2012)); see also RISA GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 29 (2007); Risa
Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50 DUKE L.J. 1609, 1678
(2001) [hereinafter Goluboff, Lost Origins].
218. In 1968, a study in Maryland uncovered that a Black man who was convicted of raping a
White woman averaged a sixteen-year sentence, as compared to a 4.2-year sentence for the rape of a
Black woman. Miller Sommerville, supra note 210, at 26. In 1991, Kimberle Crenshaw cited to a Dallas
report of rape dispositions, noting that the average prison term for a man convicted of raping a Black
woman was two years, relative to the average five-year sentence of a man convicted of raping a Latina
and ten-year sentence for conviction of rape against a White woman. Crenshaw, supra note 103, at 1269
(citing Race Tilts the Scales of Justice. Study: Dallas Punishes Attacks on Whites More Harshly, DALL.
TIMES HERALD, Aug. 19, 1990, at Al). Although current rape statistics suggest that a woman's race is
not indicative of her vulnerability to rape, studies also show that the race of the victim continues to play
a large role in the prosecution of the rape. Compare Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes,, Full Report of
the Prevalence, Incidence, and Consequences of Violence Against Women: Findings from the National
Violence Against Women Survey, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE (2000),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/183781.pdf, with Pokorak, supra note 213, at 38-43. A study in
Miami-Dade, Florida, for example, found that 58.1 percent of rejected or dismissed rape prosecutions
involved a Black victim, as compared to 31.1 percent involving a White victim. Pokorak, supra note
213, at 41 (citing Cassie Spohn, Dawn Beichner & Erika Davis-Frenzel, Prosecutorial Justifications for
Sexual Assault Case Rejection: Guarding the "'Gateway to Justice, " 48 SOC. PROBS. 206, 224 tbl. 3
(2001)). A study in Kansas City and Philadelphia examining prosecutorial decisions in rape cases
showed that prosecutors were "'41/ times more likely to file charges if the victim was white,' than if the
victim was Black," especially in cases of unarmed stranger rape. Pokorak, supra note 213, at 42 (citing
Cassia Spohn & David Holleran, Prosecuting Sexual Assault: A Comparison of Charging Decisions in
Sexual Assault Cases Involving Strangers, Acquaintances, and Intimate Partners, 18 JUST. Q. 651, 671-
73 (2001)).
219. Smith, supra note 97, at 1701 (internal citations omitted).
220. Pokorak, supra note 213, at 43.
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Therefore, while advancing a "dirty old man" narrative may be a successful
litigation strategy, 22 it is one that is built on the experience of the White, not
Black, woman. Like Beverly Balos's searching inquiry into the differential
222treatment that law and society has provided to different groups, this Article
challenges the application of the "dirty old man" narrative across groups,
especially as applied to Black women. Although the Supreme Court has
famously acknowledged privacy protections related to the sanctity of the
223home, to the extent that protection has extended to women, it has not
historically been universally applied, especially for Black women. This is not to
suggest that Black women or Black families do not view the home as sacred. In
fact, one could imagine that, where the public sphere can be a dangerous place
for Blacks in America, the home may take on increased significance as a refuge
from violence and racism. Rather, it is broader society, including institutional
actors, that has failed to treat the Black home as sacred. Legal authority and
access have permitted violation of the Black home, seen in the Fourth
Amendment context, 4 in the domestic violence context225 and in the
subsidized housing context.226 Famously, during the Memphis Riots in May of
1866, two hundred White police officers and men came into a Black
neighborhood and Black homes and "commenced an indiscriminate robbing,
burning and murdering. .... "227 A Congressional Report on the riots detailed the
atrocities, including brutal rapes and sexual terrorizing of Black women.228 By
221. See supra Section W.A.
222. Balos, supra note 29, at 79-80.
223. For a catalogue of Supreme Court cases recognizing the sanctity of the home, see Carlotta J.
Roos, DiCenso v. Cisneros: An Argument for Recognizing the Sanctity of the Home in Housing Sexual
Harassment Cases, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1131, 1139-44 (1998).
224. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820,
838, 840-41 (1994) (in responding to Akhil Amar's work on the Fourth Amendment, acknowledging the
"connections between our country's history of racial discrimination in law enforcement and the creation
of the modern pillars of Fourth Amendment law" and noting that "prevalent racial segregation in
housing allows for more aggressive and intrusive policing of black and other minority neighborhoods
than of white or mixed communities" (emphasis in original)).
225. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 95, at 14 (citing Carol 13. Stack, Cultural Perspectives on Child
Welfare, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 539, 541 (1983-84) (arguing that the misunderstanding of
cultural family patterns contributes to a disproportionate number of minority children placed in foster
homes)) (analyzing why the state intervenes more often in Black homes in child welfare matters);
Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of
Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of
Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623, 629 nn.21-22 (1976) (arguing that more minority parents are
charged with neglect because they are disproportionately on welfare and thus subject to greater social
work supervision); cf Martha A. Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family. The Limits of
Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 955, 959 (1991) (distinguishing between "private" families that earn the
right to government protection by living up to ideological expectations, and "public" families that are
subject to state supervision and control because they deviate from social norms).
226. See Priscilla A. Oven, The New Racially Restrictive Covenant: Race, Welfare, and the
Policing of Black Women in Subsidized Housing, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1540, 1543-48 (2012) (recognizing
and providing examples of the "surveillance, harassment, and regulation of subsidy-reliant Black women
and their families" through wholesale targeting of Black homes in traditionally-White neighborhoods).
227. H.R. REP. No. 39-101, at 7(1866).
228. Id. at 14.
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failing to account for how legal and extra-legal rights afforded only certain
members of society, the "dirty old man" narrative excludes a critical context to
assess liability and damages related to the residential sexual harassment of
Black women and ignores the structural factors that support and ignore the
sexual abuse.
C. Legal Authority and Location Provide Unfettered Access
The sanctity of the home construct arises from an understanding that home
229is separate from one's public life, including employment. For Black women
in certain periods of American history, that separation did not exist. In fact, the
relationship between Black women and White men, in many cases, centered on
or resided exclusively in the home. Enslaved Black women lived on their
owner's land, accessible at all times. Domestic workers worked (and sometimes
lived) in their employer's home, accessible at all times. And, for those women
vulnerable to sexual harassment at home, their landlords have access to their
homes and their families at all times. Unfettered and unregulated access to a
woman in her home increases the opportunity for and perpetuation of sexual
230
assault.
Not only have Black women lived and worked in spaces where they were
particularly vulnerable to sexual assault, but those same spaces also permitted
access to the women's families. 123 Such access increases the coercive nature of
sexual harassment. For enslaved women, slaveowners could split apart families
or otherwise punish a woman's family if she failed to concede to sexual
demands or failed to conceive children. 232 Risa Goluboff reports similar
coercion in the relationship between domestic workers and their employers. For
example, Goluboff points to a Congressional Hearing in which George
Triedman, Section Chief of the Civil Rights Section of the Department of
Justice, told the tale of a domestic worker who, upon leaving her employment,
found that her employers refused to let her son leave with her.
233
229. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 7, at 21-28; Cahan, supra note 22 at 1073.
230. Miller Sommerville, supra note 210, at 21 (Black women in slavery were vulnerable to sexual
attacks by their masters, by overseers and drivers, by young men and boys being "initiated" into sexual
intercourse, and by forced breeding with other slaves); Dabel, supra note 215, at 361 (noting that
women who worked as domestic slaves "lived with the constant threat of physical and sexual abuse").
Dabel also notes, however, that slaves who worked in the house had unique opportunities to engage in
acts of resistance. Id.
231. It is interesting to pause here to think about the usefulness of the Title VII sexual harassment
framework developed in Shellhammer and its progeny to sexual harassment directed at domestic
workers. Because, for many domestic workers, there was little to no separation between work and home,
the same critiques levied against the use of Shellhammer for residential sexual harassment cases, see
supra Section II1.C., may be equally as applicable to employment sexual harassment cases involving
domestic workers and others who work in the home.
232. Miller Sommerville, supra note 210, at 23.
233. Goluboff, Lost Origins, supra note 217, at 1664-65 (citing Hearing on Peonage and Slavery
Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 14-15 (1951) (Statement of
2016]
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The access that a landlord has to a tenant, while of a different sort, bears
resemblance to the access slaveholders had to female slaves and employers had
234to live-in domestic workers. Allegations in residential sexual harassment
cases involve landlords or their agents entering a female tenant's home
uninvited; 235 driving by a female tenant's property day and night and calling
her incessantly; 236 and roaming the halls of her apartment building at night,
237
accompanied by a guard dog. For example, one plaintiff alleged that, after
sexually assaulting her, the defendant "would stare at [her], wink at her, and
stick his tongue out whenever he would see her. [Defendant] engaged in these
actions while [plaintiff] was at her mailbox, while she was sitting on her porch,
while she was walking her dog, and while she was walking around the park. 238
Because of the landlord's professional responsibilities and the structure of his
239legal rights, he has access to his female plaintiffs, in and around their homes.
And for those landlords or agents who live on the same property as their
tenants, their access is further increased.
Further, the landlord's access to a renter's family gives him incredible
coercive power. A review of case law evidences allegations of residential
sexual harassment in front of or in close proximity to the tenant's family,
particularly young children. 24 For example, in Krueger v. Cuomo, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's finding for the tenant, relying
on the tenant's testimony that defendant:
[M]ade a habit (three to four times a week, Maze recalled) of arriving
unannounced; he would knock on the first-floor doorway, enter before
Maze could respond, and climb the internal staircase to her apartment.
George Triedman, Chief, Civil Rights Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice) (unpublished
hearing, on file with the Duke Law Journal)).
234. Cf Davis, supra note 99 (conceptualizing slavery as an early form of sexual harassment as
sexual harassment is understood in the feminist theory and literature on sexual harassment in
employment). Davis makes a compelling case for slavery as an original form of sexual harassment,
describing the sexual subjugation of enslaved women related to their "roles as captive workers." Id. at
457. While Davis recognizes that plantations operated as both home and workplaces for enslaved
women, her analogy to modem sexual harassment does not reach landlords or other perpetrators of
sexual harassment in housing. Id. at 463.
235. Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 944 (8th Cir. 2010); Salisbury v. Hickman, 974 F. Supp. 2d
1282, 1292 (E.D. Cal. 2013).
236. Glover v. Jones, 522 F. Supp. 2d 496, 501 (W.D.N.Y. 2007).
237. Chomicki v. Wittekind, 128 Wis. 2d 188, 192 (Ct. App. 1985).
238. Brillhart v. Sharp, No. 4:CV-07-1121, 2008 WL 2857713, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 21, 2008).
239. Such is also the case with respect to a landlord's agent. See Salisbury v. Hickman, 974 F.
Supp. 2d 1282, 1293 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (recognizing that, "as the on-site manager, Mr. Crimi is first in-
line to respond to any issue that might interfere with Ms. Salisbury's use and enjoyment of her
residence, such as a rent dispute or a request for repairs. Mr. Crimi's ability to influence Ms. Salisbury's
well-being thus adds yet another degree of severity to Mr. Crimi's conduct").
240. See, e.g., Fair Housing Council v. Penasquitos Casablanca Owner's Ass'n, 381 F. App'x 674,
676 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that minor children had standing under the Fair Housing Act because they
witnessed the sexual harassment of their mother).
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Once inside, he would grab and touch Maze, doing so on at least one
occasion in front of her children.
241
A landlord's access to his female tenants and their families is structural, not a
result of a deviancy. In other words, a landlord has access to a tenant and her
family due to the legal rights inherent in the landlord-tenant relationship and
economic and racial hierarchies throughout American history. The landlord's
access to tenants, of course, is generally the same, regardless of the tenant's
race. But for Black female tenants, who are burdened by the cultural myth of
the Black Jezebel and the historical ways in which Black women have been
subjected to sexual assault in the private sphere without protection or recourse,
the access is that much more dangerous.
D. The Focus on Economic Disparity Ignores the Structural Force of
Generational Privilege
Scholars and advocates have recognized the relationship between race and
poverty and the results of that intersection with respect to a woman's
vulnerability to sexual harassment in housing.242 And courts have
acknowledged the effect of economic disparity on the vulnerability to and
243
experience of residential sexual harassment. Economic disparities and, to a
lesser extent, generational economic disparity, can be found in the "dirty old
man" narrative. Yet the role of race in differentiating experiences between
Black women and other women remains obscured by the prevailing narrative.
And the prevailing narrative fails to account for the racial power that White
men have historically held in America to harass, intimidate and terrorize Black
families and Black women.
For Black women, economic and racial hierarchy is institutional and
generational. Although slaveholders held physical power over their slaves, they
also held economic and emotional power. Slaveholders invoked that racial and
economic power to engage in the sexual abuse of their Black slaves.
Slaveholders forced breeding through sexual assault and harassment. Such
abuse came with promises like lightened work load or extra food or penalties
such as punishment or sale of the woman or her family members.244
Similarly, Black domestic workers often found their way into working in a
White family's house out of economic necessity, forced into sexual
relationships with their employers in order to salvage their meager income or
protect their families.245 Risa Goluboff, in detailing the historical approach of
241. Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 1997).
242. See supra notes 154-162 and accompanying text.
243. See supra Section lI.CA.
244. Gray White, supra note 101, at 399.
245. Miller Sommerville, supra note 210, at 25.
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the Department of Justice to prosecuting civil rights actions, notes the increase
in complaints of young women working as domestic servants in the late
1940s.2 46 Goluboff calls attention to the "lack of pay, degrading conditions, and
247hard work" facing domestic servants at the time. One woman complained,
for example, that she "slept in a hen house and suffered sexual abuse, beatings,
no wages, poor conditions and treatment, and work too strenuous for a young
woman."
248
Today, Black women experience poverty at nearly double the rate of White
women, are more than twice as likely to live in inadequate housing, "have less
education and higher rates of underemployment, poverty, disease, and isolation
than white women. 24 9 That economic gap is generational and connected to
long-standing racial hierarchy in the United States. The experience of the
Black women in Pontotoc provide an example. One woman in Pontotoc
averred that the loan officer asked her if she had ever been with a white man,25n
252
asked two others if they liked white men, and, after stopping by one
declarant's home uninvited and asking to "do" her, asked if she was scared of
white men.253 These comments must be viewed through the lens of generational
economic and racial hierarchies, evidenced in a declarant's averment that it was
common knowledge that First National Bank of Pontotoc was one of the "few
places black women could have their loans processed., 254 The economic power
hierarchy cannot be separated from the historic experience of institutional and
structural racism.
As noted above, there may be legitimate tactical reasons for choosing a
"dirty old man" narrative as a case theory. Case theory is not designed to be the
255
entire story. And, yet, the choice of case theory is what "drives much of the
work in representing clients, from interviewing the client, to fact-gathering and
investigation, and finally to negotiation, trial or some other resolution of the
case." 256 So the choice of case theory matters; excluding race from case theory
has a broad impact on the women's experiences of the case, the outcome, and
damages. It challenges the court to recognize race and the structural forces
inherent in sexual harassment, or it perpetuates the stock story. This Article
246. Goluboff, Lost Origins, supra note 217, at 1663.
247. Id.
248. Id. (citing Affidavit of Polly Johnson, Washington, D.C. 1-3 (1946) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal)).
249. HARRIS-PERRY, supra note 95, at 46 (internal citations omitted).
250. See id. at 206.
251. Joint Stipulation Regarding Distribution of Settlement Fund at Affidavit No. 4 11 10, United
States v. First Nat'l Bank of Pontotoc, No. 3:06-cv-00061 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 19, 2008).
252. Id. at Affidavit No. 8 11 15, & No. 28 1 15.
253. Id. at Affidavit No. 13 1120.
254. Id. at Affidavit No. 9 13.
255. Miller, supra note 12, at 298 ("The case theory is a snapshot, a framework, the essence of the
story or what the case is about. It is not the whole story that a video camera filming the event would tell,
but rather the coherent meaning that the elements create.").
256. Id. at 297.
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argues that adoption of that "dirty old man" narrative misses an opportunity
both to account for race in residential sexual harassment and to address the
structural forces underlying the intersection of race and sex. This Article
suggests that such an approach omits a challenge to the underlying premise in
anti-discrimination law of an aberrant bad actor engaged in discrimination
unsupported by the structural forces of law and society.
CONCLUSION: BEGINNING TO RECONSTRUCT THE NARRATIVE
This Article named and critiqued the standard "dirty old man" narrative
commonly advanced in residential sexual harassment scholarship and
advocacy. 7 It exposed testimonial evidence of racialized sexual harassment in
housing and noted that, even in light of that evidence, race drops out of the
legal narrative. It argues that adoption of the stock story assumes that the
perpetrator is an aberrant bad actor, preying on economically vulnerable
women.258 The prevailing narrative ignores the possibility that racialized sexual
harassment is, in fact, a symptom of structural forces operating to perpetuate
and ignore the sexual subjugation of Black women in the private sphere.
25 9
Connecting the sexual harassment of Black women in housing across
generations through an analysis of cultural mythology and structural forces of
power, this project suggests that racialized sexual harassment stands as a
257. 1 recognize, of course, that this Article risks essentializing the experience of Black women
dealing with residential sexual harassment. Not all Black women experiencing sexual harassment in
housing suffer the same kind of harassment or feel it in the same way. Because the evidence that was
gathered for this Article establishes the near complete excision of race from the scholarly and advocacy
narratives about sexual harassment in housing, however, every Black woman's experience is subsumed
in the generic experience of sexual harassment. The narrative itself, by omitting the Black voice and the
Black experience, by making the Black victim of sexual harassment invisible, and by assuming the
defendant is an aberrant bad actor operating outside of societal norms, risks perpetuating the structural
assault on Black women. See HARRIS-PERRY, supra note 95, at 39 ("As a group, [African American
women] have neither the hiding place of private property nor a reasonable expectation of being properly
recognized in the public sphere. This situation undermines the intersecting needs for privacy and
recognition that underlie the democratic social contract."); Broussard, supra note 103, at 380 ("The first
remedy to the systemic silence would be an acknowledgement that a Black woman needs to be able to
tell 'her story' and allow a collective exorcism of the pain that has lingered just below the consciousness
of Black women for centuries.").
258. Cf Deborah N. Archer, There is No Santa Claus: The Challenge of Teaching the Next
Generation of Civil Rights Lawyers in a "Post-Racial" Society, 4 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 55, 60 (2013)
(describing how, "[i]n a post-racial world, racism is perpetrated by a few bad actors" and that "[o]vert
racial animus is seen as an aberration from our normal race neutrality"). Archer challenges the notion
that we have achieved post-racialism wherein racism is actually an aberration. In this Article, I similarly
argue that sexism, experienced as residential sexual harassment, is viewed as an aberration from the
norm. Like Archer, I challenge that construction, especially when race is factored into the analysis.
259. Of course, not all Black women experience racialized sexual harassment in rental housing of
the same variety or in the same way. I find myself drawing from critical race feminism here, which
"recognizes the need to be strategically essentialist in order to avoid simply discussing individual
experiences and to instead draw from the overlapping themes and experiences that permit a broader
analysis." Coleman, supra note 8, at 408 (citing CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER 7 (Adrien
Katherine Wing ed., 2d ed. 2003)).
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modem-day symbol of the institutional acceptance and ignorance of the sexual
subjugation of Black women.
Not only does the standard narrative disregard evidence of racialized
sexual harassment against Black women, by focusing on the aberrant bad actor,
it discounts the structural forces that have, throughout American history,
perpetuated the sexual subjugation of Black women in the private sphere.
Historian Diane Miller Sommerville argues:
[B]lack women's sexual vulnerability and the institutionalized access
that white men in America historically have had to black women's
sexuality is one of the most salient aspects of black women's lived
experiences and continues to shape black women's lives, identities,
and psyches, even through much of the twentieth century and
beyond.
In other words, the historic use of the structural elements to perpetuate sexual
abuse against Black women, especially under the cover of property, privacy
and private transaction,261 has woven permission and ignorance of racialized
sexual harassment into the fabric of our society.262 It is those structural
forces-cultural acceptance of the Jezebel myth, legal rights, access, and
generational economic and racial hierarchies-that operate to perpetuate and
silence sexual subordination of Black women in the private sphere. Those
forces were operating during slavery, against Black domestic workers and in
the state's failure to acknowledge and prosecute the full extent of sexual
assaults against Black women. And they are operating in mobile home parks,
apartment buildings, and single-family and multi-family homes across the
country.
The structure of the landlord-tenant relationship defines the landlord's
legal right to grant or deny the use and enjoyment of their property at his
discretion. It grants him the legal right to retain a copy of the tenant's key, enter
her home, determine when and home to make repairs, and deny housing.
Access gives the landlord the means to execute sexual harassment against the
260. Miller Sommerville, supra note 210, at 21.
261. Balos, supra note 29, at 79 (in assessing residential sexual harassment, noting that the
"landlord's private exchange of sex in place of cash for rent take on the appearance of a private business
transaction not to be intruded upon"). Balos, in comparing the tenant's privacy rights with the landlord's
business rights, argues that the landlord's rights are protected at the expense of the tenant's rights. Id. at
90. This Article goes a step further, recognizing that, for Black women, privacy rights have historically
been subjugated to White men's property rights. Residential sexual harassment is yet another example
where structural forces operate to perpetuate and ignore the willful disregard for Black women's privacy
rights at home.
262. See Roberts, supra note 95, at 7 ("The intimate intertwining of race and gender in the very
structure of slavery makes it practically impossible to speak of one without the other. The social order
established by white slaveowners was founded on two inseparable ingredients: the dehumanization of
Africans on the basis of race, and the control of women's sexuality and reproduction. The American
legal order is rooted in this horrible combination of race and gender.").
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tenant. Through his legal authority, he has access to her home, which gives him
access to her body and access to her family. Generational hierarchies-
economic and racial-give him the power to abuse his authority and access.
And the cultural myth of the Black Jezebel, carried over from the institution of
slavery, gives him the justification. Any of those structural elements may exist
in residential sexual harassment of a woman of any color. But it is particularly
problematic for Black women, who have been historically subjected to sexual
abuse in the private sphere with the support or willful ignorance of the state. It
is particularly salient for Black women, for whose voice and particularized
experience of residential sexual harassment the standard "dirty old man"
narrative silences.
263Recall, for example, the case of Chomicki v. Wittekind, the Wisconsin
case where the landlord, after the plaintiff rebuffed his sexual advances,
engaged in increasingly hostile harassment, including "roam[ing] through her
apartment building at all hours of the night accompanied by his guard dog."
264
At trial, Ms. Chomicki testified that she was "devastated" and "distraught" after
the defendant instituted eviction proceedings upon her sexual rebuff, that she
was forced to relocate herself and her two young children during a Wisconsin
winter, and that she had nightmares about the defendant and his patrol dog.265
In affirming the jury's $19,000 award to Ms. Chomicki, the Wisconsin appeals
court made no mention of race. According to a contemporaneous article in the
Milwaukee Journal, however, Ms. Chomicki was a "black mother of two young
children" and, in making sexual demands, the defendant allegedly told her, "All
black women like it.",
266
Chomicki demonstrates both the existence of the structural forces identified
above in racialized sexual harassment and the court's willful ignorance of the
significance of race in residential sexual harassment. Mr. Wittekind's ability to
condition Ms. Chomicki's continued tenancy on acceding to his sexual
demands arose from his legal right to evict. He used his access to Ms.
Chomicki's apartment to harass her and his access to her children to coerce her.
He adopted the Jezebel myth when justifying his conduct with the statement
that "[a]ll Black women like it,"'267 silencing Ms. Chomicki specifically and
Black women generally. And one might imagine that Ms. Chomicki, an African
American woman, was profoundly affected by Mr. Wittekind's threatening use
of a patrol dog in part because attack dogs stand as a traditional symbol of
intimidation and violence aimed at Blacks in American history. 268 Mr.
263. 128 Wis. 2d 188 (Ct. App. 1985).
264. Id. at 192.
265. Id. at 202.
266. Suit Cites Sexual Harassment, supra note 80.
267. Id.
268. See Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y. v. Project Rescue W.N.Y., 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1439
(W.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 359 (2d
Cir. 1994), aff'd as modified sub nom. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y. v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir.
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Wittekind's use of the dog evidences how institutional racial power is a
mechanism through which the sexual subjugation of Black women in the home
is perpetuated. That impact of race was, however, absent from the court's
analysis. Although specifically citing a race discrimination case finding that the
plaintiff suffered humiliation when he "was subjected to a racial indignity
which is one of the relics of slavery, 269 the Chomicki court failed to make any
connection between the defendant's conduct in this case and race.
So where do we go from here? There is significant work to be done to
educate courts and the public on the problem of sexual harassment in housing.
There is work to be done in integrating race and sex in civil rights challenges to
residential sexual harassment. The standard narrative has found some success
in challenging such harassment under a civil rights framework. 270 But it
presents a single vision of the female tenant and her experience, leaving out the
nuance and import unique to each woman, especially those Black women
experiencing racialized sexual harassment. Perhaps the answer lies in pleading
race discrimination alongside sex discrimination, pushing the courts to
understand the intersection of race and class in residential sexual harassment.
Perhaps, because the assessment of emotional damages should consider both
the "emotional distress and the circumstances of the act that allegedly caused
the distress," and "[t]he more inherently degrading or humiliating the
defendant's action is, the more reasonable it is to infer that a person would
suffer humiliation or distress from that action," 27 damages are one possible
avenue to address the impact of racialized sexual harassment in a civil rights
claim. In other words, a litigator need not specifically allege both sex
1995) (comparing violence against women seeking abortions to the civil rights movement, when
"segregationists congregated in front of schools and polling places with attack dogs and clubs in order to
intimidate blacks into foregoing their constitutional rights to an integrated education and to vote");
Irving Joyner, Pimping Brown v. Board of Education: The Destruction ofAfrican-American Schools and
the Mis-Education of African-American Students, 35 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 160, 185 (2013) (telling the
story of Greg Hannibal, one of the first Afican Americans to attend Grainger High School in North
Carolina, who remembers that "people would drive by and splash water on him, or allow their dogs to
attack him as he made his way to school"); Lewis R. Katz & Aaron P. Golembiewski, Curbing the Dog:
Extending the Protection of the Fourth Amendment to Police Drug Dogs, 85 NEB. L. REV. 735, 787
(2007) ("[L]aw enforcement has historically abused the use of canines against African-Americans. From
the slave era when dogs were used to hunt down runaway slaves, to the Civil Rights Era where police in
the South turned snarling dogs loose to control and disperse crowds gathered in peaceful protest, law
enforcement has used dogs to terrorize black communities."); Brandon M. Lofton, Fifty Years After
Brown, the Civil Rights Ideology and Today's Movement, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 719, 726
(2005) (remembering Bull Connor's use of "vicious police dogs and high-pressured water hoses to
attack the peaceful demonstrators, many of whom were children"); Douglas U. Rosenthal, When K-9s
Cause Chaos-An Examination of Police Dog Policies and Their Liabilities, 11 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 279, 307-08 (1994) (reporting LAPD statistics establishing that K-9 bites "occur most often in
neighborhoods where the population is mostly black" and reporting that, in bite case where race had
been determined, more than ninety-seven percent of the dog bit victims were Black or Latino").
269. Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., Inc., 491 F.2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1974).
270. See, e.g., Housing and Civil Enforcement Overview, supra note 46 (listing settlements and
orders in sex discrimination cases arising under the Fair Housing Act).
271. Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487,492 (7th Cir. 1997).
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discrimination and race discrimination to tell a narrative that has race
powerfully embedded within the sex discrimination case theory.272
Unquestionably, there are other, or multiple, approaches to this problem. This
Article issues a call to scholars and advocates to be thoughtful about the role of
race in residential sexual harassment and not to shy away from asserting it as
part of the case theory. It is only when lawyers-advocates and scholars-push
the law that we can see it grow and expand. Devotion to the "dirty old man"
narrative risks perpetuating the structural support of residential sexual
harassment and ignoring the interplay of race. It operates to silence, rather than
expose, the unique experience of each woman, particularly each Black woman,
victimized by sexual harassment in their homes.
272. See also Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 954 (8th Cir. 2009) ("In Gore, the Supreme Court
declared the degree of reprehensibility was '[p]erhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness
of a punitive damages award.' In assessing the degree of reprehensibility, we must consider whether 'the
harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a
reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability;
the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of
intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident."' (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 576-77 (1996))). Beyond the scope of this paper, I intend to explore in a future project
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